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Comparative Discrimination Law: Age as a Protected Ground  
 
Lucy Vickers  
Oxford Brookes University1 
Introduction  
Age is a relative late comer to anti-discrimination law and in some respects it remains an 
outsider with no specialised international convention against age discrimination to support 
domestic or regional legal frameworks.2 Although now commonly included as a protected 
ground when legal systems provide protection against discrimination, this area of law has 
been a particular challenge to courts and legislatures as they seek to identify appropriate 
parameters for legal protection. Complexity and inconsistency arise because of two 
potentially conflicting functions of age within legal systems; on the one hand age is used as a 
structural mechanism for allocating a range of rights, obligations and benefits within society. 
Yet on the other hand, age is understood as an aspect of individual identity that is worthy of 
protection against indignity or detriment.  
Age discrimination has a number of dimensions, structural, economic and social, which 
intersect with each other in a variety of ways, resulting in a complex set of concerns with 
which courts need to engage. An economic dimension to age discrimination is seen with its 
role in employment and social protection. Here age-based legislation is used to meet a 
number of economic needs, such as those stemming from the demographic change towards an 
ageing population. This change is coupled with labour market trends in some states away 
from working in older age, and this then creates an additional economic problem regarding 
sustainability of pension provision and a reduction in tax income from a shrinking working 
population. The resulting pressure to encourage increased participation in the workplace by 
older workers is combined with an additional and at times conflicting concern regarding high 
unemployment or under employment among younger people. In effect, age discrimination 
faces a ‘double bind’,3 in which there is pressure to create employment for both older and 
younger workers in order to fulfil economic imperatives.  
At the same time, age discrimination clearly raises questions which go far beyond the 
economic. Age equality has a clear social dimension, in which age is viewed as a 
characteristic, like sex, race and disability, where the law aims to end less favourable 
treatment, redress disadvantage and remove associated stigma. Yet, as with the economic 
dimension, the social dimension contains contradictions, and can so be said to encompass a 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to many colleagues who have discussed the themes in this review with me, in particular 
Simonetta Manfredi and Pnina Alon-Shenker. The usual disclaimer applies.  
2Age is not specifically included as an equality ground in the UDHR or ECHR, although it has been interpreted 
to be included in ‘other status’. EU equality law only protected against age discrimination from 2000, and even 
then the age provisions of Directive 2000/78 included a longer transposition date than the protection provided in 
other grounds. The 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights did not include age as a protected characteristic although age is 
included in 1982 Charter of Fundamental Freedoms. Age is not included in the 1963 Title VII civil rights 
protection in the US, although age discrimination against those over 40 was protected from 1967 in separate 
legislation. See further, C. O’Cinnede, ‘Constitutional and Fundamental Rights Aspects of Age Discrimination’ 
in A Numhauser-Henning and M Rönnmar (eds), Age Discrimination and Labour Law: Comparative and 
Conceptual Perspectives in the EU and Beyond (Kluwer, The Netherlands, 2015). 
3 F.Hendrickx ‘Age and European Employment Discrimination Law’ in F.Hendrickx  Active Ageing and 
Labour Law (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012). 
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second ‘double bind’: on the one hand, in some fundamental respects, age differs from other 
protected characteristics because it changes: we all start young, and hope to live to become 
old. On the other hand, age shares some fundamental similarities with other characteristics, 
warranting its inclusion in the protected list. As with other grounds, less favourable treatment 
of a group or individual on grounds of age can be viewed as an affront to individual dignity, 
particularly if the treatment is based on stereotypical assumptions about capacity reducing 
with age.  
In addition, many work and social systems are infused with age related rules, such as 
redundancy schemes which take account of length of service, minimum ages before certain 
types of work are allowed, etc. Yet, it can be observed that these age limits are fairly 
arbitrary. Not much changes overnight between the ages of 17 to 18 which suggest that the 
individual’s abilities change sufficiently to warrant the change in legal capacities that are then 
bestowed; similarly capacity to work does not change overnight from the age of 64 to 65 
when traditionally retirement has occurred.  
Although age is not immutable, and changes over time, nonetheless, it can lead to 
disadvantageous treatment. As a result, equality law has created protections against both the 
economic and social disadvantages that can arise if older workers are prevented from 
working, or where younger workers are paid lower wages or not given work due to 
stereotypical assumptions about their ability to do the job. Concepts of equality based on 
upholding individual dignity, redressing disadvantage and overcoming stigma would seem to 
be apt in such situations. 
These two dimensions of age discrimination, the economic aspects and the equality aspects, 
both contain some internal contradictions. Moreover, they intersect in various ways when age 
discrimination is addressed by the law; and those intersections may differ depending on the 
age group concerned. As a result the law is faced with many questions and conundrums: is 
age something that should be protected because it can be a relevant signifier of disadvantage 
for both the young and old? Does it matter that such disadvantages are not experienced by all 
members of the group? To what extent does the fact that age changes for each individual 
affect the way in which the law should protect this characteristic?  
This assessment of the comparative approaches to age equality is divided into three main 
parts. In Chapter 1 the underpinning questions and themes related to the two main dimensions 
of age discrimination (the structural/economic and the social/equality) are explored. Chapter 
2 then considers the law on age discrimination in a number of jurisdictions. Chapter 3 
concludes with an assessment of the extent to which these underpinning questions can 
explain the developing case law.  
Chapter 1 - Thematic issues  
Age discrimination engages a wide and complex spectrum of issues ranging from the 
economic importance of all workers, old and young, having access to the workplace and other 
social goods, to underpinning notions of equality and social justice that require the 
eradication of stereotyped or assumptions or irrelevant and prejudicial categorisations. In the 
following sections, different aspects of the two dimensions of age equality are explored, with 
a view to better understanding how they should inform the development of appropriate 
parameters for the law on age equality.  
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Economic and structural dimensions  
The first dimension of age equality to be explored is its economic dimension and its 
interaction with the structures of the labour market. Age is a key differential for a number of 
different aspects of social and working life: obvious examples include capacity to vote, 
marry, drive and access work. Social security benefits are also differentiated by age, with 
pensions paid to those over a certain age, and minimum wages and other benefits linked to 
the age of the claimant. In addition, labour market practices, such as the use of length of 
service as a criterion in redundancy decisions, lead to differential treatment related, albeit 
indirectly, to age. Alongside the embeddedness of age into the structures of the labour market 
and other social processes, the age demographic of the population has a key role in a state’s 
economy generally as well as having a significant impact on the labour market in particular. 
These different elements of the economic dimension of age equality are assessed below.      
Demographic trends  
Many areas of the world, including the USA and Europe, are experiencing the long term 
trend of an ageing population.4 For example in the USA, by 2030, over 20 percent of the 
population are expected be aged 65 and over, up from 13 percent in 2010 and 9.8 percent in 
1970. In Europe, increases vary according to each state, but overall the EU has seen an 
increase of 2.4 percent in the proportion of the population over 65 over the last decade. A 
similar pattern can be seen in many other countries such as Japan and Australia, although the 
opposite trend can be seen in many countries in Africa.5 Where there is an increase in older 
persons within a population this is coupled with a reduction in the proportion of working-age 
persons in the population. This leads to an economic unbalance as fewer working age people 
are available to support the older persons in the population.  
In response to the ageing of the population, many of the accepted work patterns developed 
over the last century in the west have been unsettled, such as an expectation that older 
workers will retire with pension provision to fund themselves for a relatively short number of 
years. Traditional pension models may be inadequate when people live longer, as pensions 
will need to go further. Although the assumption that an aging population has led to a pension 
crisis can be questioned,6 nonetheless, it is unsurprising that one response to the increase in 
longevity has been the development of national and transnational policies and agendas to 
encourage longer working lives. For example, in the EU the year 2012 was designated the 
European Year for Active Ageing, and aimed to increase participation of older workers in the 
labour market, and encourage ‘extended working lives’ through the encouragement of an 
‘active ageing agenda’. The main legal response to this demographic trend has been the 
prohibition of age discrimination, discussed more below.   
One might expect that the ageing of the general population would lead to a corresponding 
increase in participation of older workers in the work place, and in some states this trend can 
be seen. For example in Canada the employment rate for men aged 65 to 69 almost doubled 
between 2000 and 2010, and over the same period the rate for women increased from 6.9% to 
                                                 
4 See Jennifer M. Ortman, Victoria A. Velkoff, and Howard HoganAn Aging Nation: The Older Population in 
the United States Population Estimates and Projections Current Population Reports, Issued May 2014 P25-1140, 
available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf accessed 27/10/17; and Eurostat data 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing#Main_statistical_findings accessed 27/10/17. 
5 See data produced by the World Bank at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS accessed 
27/10/17. 
6 J.Grady, Trade Unions and the Pension Crisis: Defending Member Interests in a Neoliberal World, Employee 
Relations, (2013) Vol.35 No 3: 294-308. 
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16.6%.7 However, that trend has not been replicated in other countries, and some states in 
Europe have seen a reduction in the length of working life, and a decline in participation in 
work from older workers. This reduction in participation in the workforce has significant 
economic effects on the sustainability of pension benefits as there are even fewer working 
people to support a further enlarged population of economically inactive people.8  
At the same time as these changes in demographics and labour market participation for older 
people, significant changes have also occurred in the labour market participation for younger 
workers. High levels of unemployment as well as working poverty can be seen in the younger 
populations around the world. ILO statistics show that globally the youth unemployment rate 
rising, with the rate rising fastest in emerging countries. In developing countries the rate is 
more stable, but the absolute numbers of unemployed youth is expected to rise due to an 
expanding labour force. In developed countries, the rate of unemployment is highest. 
Moreover, even for those in work, job quality is a concern: many young people are working, 
but at wages which will not lift them out of poverty. Indeed, younger people experience a 
higher incidence of working poverty or relative poverty than other adults. In addition young 
people frequently work in informal, part-time or temporary jobs and are doing so 
involuntarily.9 
The statistics on youth employment show that while the population is ageing, younger people 
are experiencing particular difficulties in accessing the labour market, either at all, or on 
equal terms with older workers. The high levels of under- or unemployment among young 
people can lead to conflict between generations, whereby older workers are understood to 
block the employment prospects of younger workers by remaining in their jobs into older 
age. What is termed ‘intergenerational justice’ then requires that older workers should hand 
their jobs on to younger workers in order to give them a fair chance in life. This approach has 
been criticised as based on a flawed economic model and remains contested,10 but, 
nonetheless, the potential for conflict between different age groups remains a concern for 
those developing polices to manage age discrimination.  
A further aspect of the demographics associated with age relates to the interaction of age, 
both youth, and older age, with poverty.11 The high rates of under- and unemployment for 
youth will lead to a strong correlation between youth and poverty, as under- or 
unemployment reduces young people’s ability to support themselves economically. Clearly 
this will have a long term impact as their economic outlook will be diminished by their 
impoverished start to working life. Moreover, the effects are likely to endure as they will be 
unlikely to be able to start a process of saving for older age. In older age the pattern is 
repeated, whereby shorter working lives and increased longevity can lead to poverty in old 
age. However, the correlation of poverty with older age is not straightforward. For example, 
                                                 
7 See Statistics Canada, available at https://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2011004/article/11578-eng.htm 
accessed 17/11/17.  
8 Manfredi S, Vickers L, 'The Challenges of Active Ageing in the UK: A Case Study of the Approach to 
Retirement in the UK' in Manfredi S, Vickers L (ed.), Challenges of Active Ageing: Equality Law and the 
Workplace, Palgrave Macmillan UK (2016).  
9 See the ILO World Employment Social Outlook: Trends for Youth 2106  report 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_513739.pdf accessed 30/10/17. 
10 S Fredman, ‘The Age of Equality; in S Fredman and S Spencer, Age as an Equality Issue: Legal and Policy 
Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) at p. 46. 
11 See Income Poverty in Old Age: An Emerging Development Priority, UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Programme on Ageing, available at:  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/documents/PovertyIssuePaperAgeing.pdf accessed 30/10/17. 
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in the UK, while levels of poverty among the over 70s is high, equally a subset of the over 
65s have never been so wealthy.12 
This split in the economic fortunes of the older population adds a complex layer to 
discussions of the economic dimension to age equality. A focus on the strong economic 
position of many older people can lead to a narrative in which older people are blamed for 
taking up more than their fair share of national resources. For example, in 2010 the UK 
conservative politician David Willetts (then Minister for Higher Education) argued that the 
baby boomer generation had taken resources away from younger generations and ought to 
give them back.13 Such a narrative can create additional intergenerational conflict14 and 
undermine social cohesion, as it removes sympathy for older people who live in poverty 
based on stereotypical assumptions that older people have never had it so good.  
In sum, the data on the demographics of age is complex, multi-layered, and problematic: we 
have an ageing population but one that has, in some states, a shrinking engagement with the 
workplace; older age can correlate both with poverty and with greater wealth than in other 
age groups; younger workers face an employment deficit while also being needed to underpin 
pension provision for a greater proportion of older workers in the population. The paradoxical 
relationship between age and poverty means that a transparent and consistent social policy 
agenda on age discrimination is likely to remain elusive. Moreover, it is not even clear 
whether the overarching aim of the law on age discrimination should be to address the 
problems that relate to the interaction of the age with social structures including the operation 
of the labour market. Instead, strong alternative reasons exist for protecting against age 
discrimination, reasons that relate to equality and individual dignity, rather than to issues of 
poverty and labour market access. These are discussed as part of the second dimension of age 
discrimination below. First, two further structural aspects of age discrimination are 
considered.   
Age equality and the labour market  
In many respects, age is institutionalised in the structures of the labour market. Age infuses 
many aspects of the labour market, and age related rules and practices can be seen in many 
areas, most fundamentally in relation to restrictions on child labour and the acceptance of 
retirement rules. Numerous other examples can be found, some of which have since been 
challenged in the courts: Italy imposed limits on the use of zero hours contracts, but not for 
those under 25 and over 55, in order to encourage their employment;15 in Germany fixed term 
contracts were limited for those under 52, but no objective reason was needed for those over 
52;16 and in the UK redundancy payment rates vary by age with those over 40 receiving 
higher rates of redundancy compensation. Moreover, many employers allow for incremental 
pay scales which increase with length of service, which is, of course, linked indirectly with 
age.17    
                                                 
12 C D’Arcy & L Gardiner The Generation of Wealth: Asset accumulation across and within cohorts (June 2017) 
available at http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2017/06/Wealth.pdf accessed 30/10/17. 
13 D. Willetts, The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took their Children’s Future – And How they can Give it 
Back (Atlantic Books, 2010). 
14 A. Numhauser-Henning An Introduction to Elder Law and the Norma Elder Law Research Environment, 
Different Approaches to Elder Law (2013) The Norma Research Programme Faculty of Law Lund University. 
15 See Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl  v. Antonino Bordonaro Case C-143/16, decision of AG Bobek on 
23 March 2017.  
16Mangold (C-144/04) decision of the CJEU of 22 November 2005.  
17 Cadman v Health and Safety Executive Case C-17/05. 
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Many of these policies and practices can be justified if age discrimination is understood from 
an economic perspective. Some practices reflect the idea that different age groups have 
different needs at different career stages. Thus, flexibility or lower wages at the start of a 
career may make a worker more attractive to employers, given their relative lack of 
experience which could otherwise act as a hindrance to gaining employment. Alternatively, 
age related rules may be the result of collective bargaining and reflect the wishes of those in 
work (e.g. increased pay with long service), and redundancy selection processes that reward 
long service (e.g. ‘last in first out’). Others rules, such as enhanced redundancy payments for 
older workers, reflect a concern to protect older workers from the hardships of an ageist 
employment market and a concern that older workers may find it difficult to find new work.   
Whilst it is arguable that these practices reflect ageist assumptions and should be rooted out if 
age equality is to be achieved, age infused labour market structures may in fact reflect the 
wishes of most workers, and create a fair structure when viewed across the whole of a career, 
or across the complete course of a person’s life.18  
One justification for increasing wages over time is explored by Jolls,19 who suggests that the 
increase in wages over time only partially reflects increased productivity. Higher wages are 
also justified as a way to incentivise workers and to reflect individuals’ psychological 
preference for improved wages over time. In effect, pay is back loaded, with lower wages 
paid compared to productivity in the early years of a career, compensated by the payment of 
higher wages compared to productivity in later years.20 This uneven wage/work bargain has 
generally been accepted by workers, who prefer to see their wages increase steadily over 
time, and is reflected in many collectively bargained salary schemes. This bargain only works 
if employers keep to their side of the bargain and continue to pay the higher wage premium in 
the second half of people’s careers. Thus, according to Jolls, the justification of age 
discrimination legislation is that it ties employers’ hands, ensuring that they continue to 
employ workers once they are enjoying the high wage phase of employment. This way of 
understanding the structure of wages and employment can be used to justify some elements 
of age discrimination in wages on the basis that it benefits the generality of workers over all, 
and is fair if understood across the whole life course.  
However work structures based on age differentials for wages are not problem-free, and may 
not be fair when viewed from an individual perspective. They are based on one particular 
model of employment in which workers have job security across fairly long working lives. 
Those who have taken career breaks, or who have entered the workforce later, may not 
benefit from the higher wages for long enough to compensate for lower wages earlier on. 
Moreover, the model assumes that the period during which the highest rates are paid will end 
with retirement at a set age. Without retirement, older workers can work indefinitely at the 
higher premium level for longer than originally set at the start of the bargain, and they will 
end up over paid across their careers.  
Thus if incremental rises in wages over time are to work fairly, they must be coupled with the 
use of retirement at a pre-agreed time, so that the periods of under- and over- payment 
compared to productivity are balanced out. Yet, as discussed below, compulsory retirement 
remains contentious as it involves unequal treatment on grounds of age.  
                                                 
18 See D McKerlie, ‘Equality and Time’ (1989) 99 Ethics 475, G Cupit, ‘Justice, Age, and Veneration’ (1998) 
108 Ethics 702 cited in R Horton, ‘Justifying Age Discrimination in the EU’ in U Belavusau and K Henrard, EU 
Anti-Discrimination Law beyond Gender (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2018). 
19 C. Jolls, ‘Hands-tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’ (1996) 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1813. 




Moreover, this model only works as long as it is adopted across the whole of the labour 
market: older workers will only deserve the higher premium pay if is balanced against lower 
pay earlier on in their careers; if workers do not work for long enough at the higher rate, they 
will have been under paid across their careers; and employers will only be able to afford to 
pay the higher wages of older workers if all employers are bound into the same structures. 
But if the labour market structure on which this is based is disrupted, then the process will 
break down. The introduction of new flexible, or precarious, approaches to employment, 
discussed below, sees just this disruption of the traditional labour market, and this has 
consequences for wages and employment security. The impact can be seen on all workers, 
with particular effects on younger and older workers.    
Changes in the organisation of work  
Age based structures in the labour market can more easily be justified when standard forms 
of employment trajectory are assumed, in which staff enjoy long uninterrupted careers, 
ending in retirement at a prearranged age. Recent changes to the standard form contract have 
challenged this model. In particular, increased flexibility in labour market structures and 
changes in the way in which the law treats retirement have a number of consequences which 
relate to age discrimination. The interaction of pay schemes that are structured around age, 
with new forms of employment and changes in the law relating to retirement, discussed next, 
create a complex dimension to debates on the correct parameters of age discrimination.   
Move to precarious and flexible work 
Changes in the organisation of work have been widespread over recent years, with an 
increase in flexible and non-standard modes of working,21 in particular the growth of zero-
hours contracts and the rise of the ‘gig’22 and ‘collaborative’ economy.23 The change away 
from traditional labour market structures to more flexible, but at the same precarious, 
working structures can be explained as a response to deregulatory politics and economics, 
which have resulted in deregulation in a number of areas including the labour market. This 
deregulatory turn in the labour market, leaves many workers vulnerable: the impact on 
women has been noted by Fredman,24 and to this can be added workers whose vulnerability is 
based on age, both younger and older workers.  
As seen above, the number of young people who are under-employed is growing, and one of 
the causes is an increase in precarious jobs, in which job security as it is traditionally 
understood is markedly reduced. For example, the gig economy, where work is made 
available through ‘platform sharing,’ operates outside of traditional employment contract:25 
payment is made per job completed, and there is no notion of incremental pay that rewards 
long service, working time protections, or health and safety rules, let alone redundancy or 
unfair dismissal rules. Zero-hours contracts and other forms of precarious work also leave 
staff vulnerable to downturns in work, effectively moving most of the risks in the enterprise 
                                                 
21For a review of changes to employment law in Europe see N Countouris, M Freedland (eds) Resocialising 
Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 2013. 
22 J Prassl, M Risak, ‘Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers-Rethinking the Legal Analysis of 
Crowdwork’ (2015) 37 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 619. 
23 See  C Codagnone and B Martens Scoping the Sharing Economy: Origins, Definitions, Impact and Regulatory 
Issues (European Commission, 2016) available at https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/JRC100369.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
24 S Fredman, ‘Women at Work: The Broken Promise of Flexicurity’ (2004) 33 (4) Industrial Law Journal 299–
319. 
25 Although recent case law in the UK suggests that those working for the gig economy should be classified as 
workers. Uber v Aslam and others [2017] UKEAT 0056_17_1011.  
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from the employer to the service provider, who is at times denied even the more limited 
protection available to workers.  
Although these trends affect the workforce as a whole, the rise in precarious work can be 
seen to have a particular impact on workers who face any additional vulnerability in the 
workplace, including those at risk of discrimination on any grounds including age. Indeed, 
flexible working arrangements such as fixed term employment, and internships (often unpaid) 
are commonly offered to young people as a way to promote their entry into the workplace, at 
a stage when they may lack the competitive edge given their lack of experience in 
comparison with older workers.26 Under the traditional labour market conditions, such 
workers would have expected to transition to more stable employment later in their careers, 
but the increase in the non-traditional types of work can mean that workers either get stuck in 
precarious work, or lose their employment to be replaced by younger workers. This pattern is 
likely to create problems in later life, if insufficient stable employment results in reduced or 
non-existent pension provision.  
The increase in precarious work also has an impact on older workers. First, for those who 
have participated in traditional labour market structures, a shift to payment per job results in 
an injustice if they have been paid below market rates for some part of their careers on the 
expectation of increased pay later on. Second, for those for whom ageing means a reduced 
capacity to work, any change in employment is likely to involve a move to more precarious 
types of employment. The removal of retirement as a mechanism available to employers to 
manage performance (discussed below) may mean that older workers looking for work are 
likely to be offered fixed term work rather than permanent work.  
Shifts in the organisation of work can give rise to a second type of difficulty when addressing 
age discrimination. Where employers seek to dismantle parts of their organisational structures 
that are potentially age-discriminatory, such as age related pay structures, comparative 
unfairness will develop between the terms and conditions of workers of different ages. For 
example where a workplace pays using a deferred benefits system whereby pay increases 
over time without a tight correlation to performance, the system only remains fair if it 
continues for the full working lifetime of the individual, so that they get the correct amount of 
compensatory higher pay. If these structures are changed, injustice can arise: either over 
payment if compulsory retirement is removed; or under payment if payment of strict market 
value payments are made, as is likely to happen if workers are paid by the job as happens 
particularly under the gig economy.  
The complexity of introducing changes to the organisational structures of work has a 
significant impact on the operation of the law on age discrimination. Straightforward 
concepts of formal equality, understood as same treatment for workers of different ages are 
likely to be inadequate to the task of achieving fairness. Instead, courts will need to be 
sensitive to the fact that changes in working structures can benefit and disadvantage different 
groups of workers at different stages of their working lives.  
Retirement and age discrimination  
As well as changes towards greater flexibility in the organisation of work, changes have also 
taken place with regard to retirement. The assumption that workers will retire has played an 
                                                 
26 See M Rönnmar, ‘Age Discrimination and Labour Law, a comparative analysis’ in A Numhauser-Henning 
and M Rönnmar (eds), Age Discrimination and Labour Law: Comparative and Conceptual Perspectives in the 
EU and Beyond (Kluwer, The Netherlands, 2015). 
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important role in many organisations,27 and continues to affect organisations and individuals 
in terms of performance management systems, workforce planning, individual career choices 
and personal and institutional financial planning. The prohibition on age discrimination, 
taken with the demographic changes outlined above, has created particular challenges for the 
management of the traditional approach to retirement.  
In terms of workforce demographics, as noted above, trends have varied with some states 
seeing an increase in numbers working beyond traditional retirement ages, and others seeing 
trends towards early retirement. In addition, states regulate retirement in very different ways: 
some states allow mandatory retirement, others such as the UK and Canada, have abolished 
the practice. Other states impose mandatory retirement on the public sector, or allow 
collective agreements to impose retirement ages across whole sectors of employment.28  
The ways in which different states have responded to the issue of retirement is discussed 
further in later sections, together with the ways in which social and economic dimensions 
interact in the case of retirement. At this stage, it is worth noting that changes in retirement 
practice form a key aspect of the structural changes currently taking place in the organisation 
of the labour market.  
Conclusions on the structural dimension of the labour market:  
The economic and structural dimension to age equality reveals a complex set of factors likely 
to influence its legal treatment. The legal framework governing age discrimination operates 
in a context of significant change, not only in terms of the demographics of the workplace, 
but also in terms of the organisation of work from standard work contracts to more flexible 
forms of work. These changes create a significant challenge to those interpreting the legal 
framework. Yet the complexity facing courts is compounded by debates concerning the social 
dimension of age equality, in which fundamental questions are raised regarding why and on 
what basis age is included in the list of protected characteristics in equality law. It is this 
second dimension of age equality that is discussed next.  
The social dimension of age equality 
Although age discrimination raises a range of economic issues, it nonetheless retains, at its 
core, notions of social justice. Older people can be subjected to stigma, detrimental treatment, 
ageist stereotypes and social exclusion; young people are also subjected to stereotypes and  
often less favourable treatment in terms and conditions of employment. To the extent that 
these disadvantages are linked to age, it can be seen that, although a late comer to equality 
law, age discrimination sits clearly within an equality framework and should share its general 
aims.  
However, even here there is room for debate, as the meaning of the term ‘equality’, and 
hence the aims of equality law have been the subject of extensive academic debate.29  It is not 
intended to consider the debate in detail here, but rather to consider the implications of that 
debate for age discrimination.  
                                                 
27See C Kilpatrick, ‘The New UK Retirement Regime, Employment Law and Pensions’(2008) 37 ILJ 1 for 
discussion of the history and development of retirement and pensions.  
28 See A comparative analysis of non-discrimination law in Europe 2016 (European Equality Law Network, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016). 
29 See for example, C. O’Cinneide, ‘Fumbling Towards Coherence: The Slow Evolution of Equality and Anti-
Discrimination Law in Britain’ (2006) NILQ 57, C. Barnard and B. Hepple, ‘Substantive Equality’ (2000) 59 
CLJ 562, S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002), B. Hepple, ‘The Aims of Equality Law’ in C. 
O’Cinneide and J. Holder (eds) Current Legal Problems (Oxford: OUP, 2008).  
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At its most basic, equality can be understood in formal or symmetrical terms, requiring that 
like cases be treated alike, but such an approach has limitations, in particular the difficulty in 
determining when two cases are alike. The problem of finding appropriate comparators has 
long created difficulties for equality law, leading Westen30 famously to argue that equality is 
an empty or at least a circular concept. This can be coupled with concerns that like treatment 
can be achieved by a levelling down of benefits when equality is claimed, thus denying 
everyone a benefit rather than extending it to all.31  
The shortcomings of the formal equality concept have led to the development of more 
substantive concepts of equality. The model discussed here is based on Fredman’s proposed 
four-fold approach to equality, which draws on insights from current debates on the meaning 
of equality. Her model envisages that equality should aim to: redress disadvantage; recognise 
the importance of individual dignity and identity and tackle stereotype and stigma; address 
social exclusion and promote participation; and achieve structural change to accommodate 
difference.32 Such an approach involves a social model of equality in which the focus is not 
only on the physical capacities associated with particular characteristics, but with the way in 
which society treats the individual. 
Applying the substantive concept of equality to age discrimination suggests that, to the extent 
that age is related to disadvantage, stigma, the infringement of dignity and social exclusion, it 
should be included within the protection of equality law. Where such aims are met, protection 
against age discrimination can be justified despite the fact that age is in some respects 
different from other protected characteristics (most obviously because everyone has an age, 
and it changes over time). However, the reverse is also true: where these aims are not met, 
perhaps because the treatment serves a purely economic aim, unequal treatment on the basis 
of age may be justified.  
Aspects of the aims of equality law are considered in what follows, in order to assess the 
strength of the social dimensions of equality as it applies to age. As with the economic 
dimension to age equality, the social dimension will also be seen to contain contradictions 
and complexities, meaning that the social egalitarian case against age discrimination is not 
clear cut.  
Dignity  
Moving beyond the concept of equality as being about achieving same treatment, a clear 
alternative aim for equality law is to uphold individual dignity and identity. The concept of 
dignity is well established as foundational in human rights law33 and is based on the idea that 
humans all have an essential dignity and should be treated, in Kant’s terms, as ends rather 
than means.34 Dignity is underpinned by the moral judgment that humans are of intrinsic, 
incomparable and indelible worth, independent of their abilities or accomplishments.35 The 
idea that human beings can expect others to respect the dignity inherent in their humanity is 
one that has been agreed virtually universally, perhaps most famously in the Universal 
                                                 
30 See P Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harv. L.R. 537. 
31 See for example, C Barnard and B Hepple, ‘Substantive Equality’ (2000) 59 CLJ 562 and S Fredman, 
Discrimination Law (Oxford, OUP, 2002).  
32 H Collins ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 MLR 16, S Fredman, The Future of 
Equality In Britain, EOC, Working Paper Series No. 5, (London, Equal Opportunities Commission 2002) 11, S 
Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 712. 
33 For further discussion see C McCrudden (ed.) Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford, OUP, 2013). 
34 E Kant, The Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (H J Paton, trans) (London, 
Hutchinson, 1963). 
35 D Réaume, ‘Discrimination and Dignity’ (2003) 63 Louisiana LR 645, 675. 
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Declaration of Human Rights: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights’.36 
One benefit of basing the idea of equality on the foundation of dignity is that it creates room 
to provide broader recognition37 for different identifies. It encompasses the idea that equality 
and dignity can mean more than just the equalising of benefits and advantages as between 
different people, but can involve recognition of the uniqueness of individuals, and their 
distinctiveness. The concept of ‘recognition’ in this sense is based on the view that in order to 
realise human dignity, autonomy and equality fully, humans need to be able to develop a 
sense of personal identity and to have that identity recognised, respected and valued. Thus 
equality demands that that the self-respect and sense of self-worth of individuals is 
preserved.38  
Whilst aiming to uphold individual dignity may be a laudable aim, it is worth noting that the 
concept has been challenged as a foundational basis for equality and human rights in general. 
Moreover, in particular respects it may provide an inadequate theoretical underpinning for 
laws prohibiting age discrimination.  
In general terms, dignity can be understood to be just as empty a concept as equality, ready to 
be filled by a wide range of meanings not all of which will be honourable.39 Indeed, as 
Fredman points out, dignity is capable of being understood in a hierarchical way, and has its 
history in ideas of rank and hierarchy.40 Furthermore, Gearty suggests that the range of 
meanings makes the concept of dignity susceptible to being used by those already in power, 
to assert their interests against the democratic will.41 This would seem to have particular 
resonance in the case of age, as the main beneficiaries of age discrimination protection in the 
US have been older white men in relatively high status and highly paid jobs.42  
A further critique of dignity arguments is that dignity can be understood in individualised 
terms and can thus be used to undermine more community based goods. Again the argument 
has resonance in respect to age, where the use of retirement may work as a communal good if 
it increases the access of younger workers to the labour market, but it may at the same time 
infringe individual dignity.43  
The example of retirement illustrates the difficulties in using dignity as a core aim of equality 
law. Compulsory retirement can be understood to undermine dignity, because work acts as a 
source of identity and status.44 Denying workers access to this benefit on the basis of age, by 
                                                 
36 Art 1. Dignity also features in the preamble to the United Nations Charter, and the preambles of the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR. 
37 See N Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’ (2000) 3 New Left Review 107 and C Taylor, Multiculturalism and 
‘The Politics of Recognition’ (1992, Princeton University Press, Princeton). 
38 Rawls identifies self-respect as a ‘primary good’. A Theory Of Justice (Oxford, OUP, 1999, revised edition).  
39 C Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Abingdon, Routledge-
Cavnendish, 2007) cited in C. McCrudden (ed.) Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford, OUP, 2013); and R. 
O’Connell, The role of dignity in equality law; lessons from Canada and South Africa (2008) 6(2) International 
J. Constitutional law 267. 
40 S Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 712. 
41 C Gearty, ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Basic Needs, and Human Dignity: A Perspective from Law’s Front Line’ 
in C. McCrudden (ed.) Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford, OUP, 2013). 
42 G. Rutherglen, ‘From Race to Age: the Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law (1995) 24(2) 
The Journal of Legal Studies 491; J Z Rothenberg, D S Gardner ‘Protecting Older Workers: The Failure of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967’ (2011) 38(1) Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 9. 
43 R. O’Connell, The role of dignity in equality law; lessons from Canada and South Africa (2008) 6(2) 
International J. Constitutional law 267. 
44 K Karst, ‘The Coming Crisis Of Work In Constitutional Perspective’ [1997] Cornell LR 523, 532. 
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requiring that they retire, diminishes dignity and thus infringes equality interests. However, 
giving dignity too much emphasis in this context may run counter to other concepts of 
equality. In the first place, the sense of dignity in work may not be universally experienced, 
but rather focused more on high status workers. Moreover, whilst an interest in the identity 
and status enhancing aspects of a job may be important to the individual, this may not be a 
sufficiently strong interest to outweigh other interests such as those of younger workers to 
work.45 The competing interests of older workers to stay in work in order to maintain a sense 
of dignity, with the interests of younger workers to have access to the same dignity enhancing 
work demonstrates the limitations of using dignity as a basis for determining age 
discrimination cases.  
Whilst the case for including age as a protected characteristic can be made on the basis of 
upholding dignity, the claim is not absolute. In effect, if the overriding aim of equality law is 
to uphold dignity, then less favourable treatment on the basis of age which does not involve 
dignitary harm or express contempt will be more readily justified.46 
In addition to arguments regarding the role of dignity as a foundational concept of equality 
law in general and age discrimination in particular, dignity has been used in a very specific 
way in legal debates over retirement. One of the justifications for imposing mandatory 
retirement in the EU case law has been that retirement can help avoid the indignity that can 
otherwise occur when disciplinary processes are triggered to force out older workers on the 
basis of poor performance or incapacity. For example, in Rosenbladt47 the CJEU accepted as 
legitimate the aim of avoiding dismissal of older workers because ‘they are no longer capable 
of working, which may be humiliating for those who have reached an advanced age.’ 
Similarly, in Hörnfeldt v Meddelande48 the CJEU confirmed as legitimate the aim of avoiding 
‘a situation in which employment contracts are terminated in situations which are humiliating 
for elderly workers’.49 In effect, the Court has accepted retirement as a gentler form of 
performance management, allowing careers to end naturally, rather than in humiliating 
disciplinary processes. 
Whilst it was argued above that dignity arguments should not automatically lead to the 
eradication of retirement, it is equally plain that dignity should not be used to justify 
retirement in this way. This particular use of dignity makes assumptions that performance 
deteriorates with age, and that older workers may need help in recognizing this. It thus relies 
on stereotypes not only about declining capability but also about reduced insight into one’s 
abilities, just the sort of prejudicial assumptions that the law on age discrimination is 
designed to combat.  
The role of dignity in age discrimination is thus more complex than might at first seem. First, 
the concept of dignity itself can be contested and contradictory. For example, attempts to 
avoid humiliation for older workers by enforcing retirement may be framed as dignity claims, 
but are themselves imbued with aged based stereotypes and are instead antithetical to a 
dignity based approach. Second, dignity arguments can be used on both sides in cases of 
differential treatment on the basis of age. On the one hand, dignity based arguments can 
overcome difficulties which might otherwise arise in relation to discrimination claims, for 
example in finding the correct comparator. A dignity based approach allows a court to be 
                                                 
45 This argument is made on the assumption that any retirement policy is imposed in order to ensure the turnover 
of employment from the older to the younger generation, discussed above at page XXX . 
46 The use of this argument in the Canadian case law is discussed below at page XXX.  
47 Rosenbladt -v- Ollerking Gebaudereinigungsges.mbH C45/09 at para 43. 
48 Case C-141/11 Judgment of the CJEU 5 July 2012. 
49 At para 34. 
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sensitive to the wrongs that are wrought by stereotype and disrespect attached to different age 
groups. On the other hand, age claims may at the same time be weakened when based on 
dignity; to the extent that less favourable treatment is based not on contempt or stigma but on 
more neutral economic grounds, it might be justified.  
In effect, dignity is a plastic concept, open to many interpretations and able to be deployed in 
its various guises on both sides of any debate. Thus although reliance on dignity may help 
frame our understanding of age discrimination in some respects, if age equality law is framed 
only as a dignity based right, our understanding of its compass will remain incomplete.  
Stigma  
Fredman suggests that, rather than relying on the idea of dignity, is may be helpful to 
disaggregate the social aims of equality law, by focusing instead on developing ‘recognition’ 
and eradicating stigma and stereotype. Such ideas are based on the same foundational ideas 
around human dignity but they give more concrete content to what may otherwise be a 
somewhat opaque concept.  
One alternative reading of equality law, which may enhance our understanding of age 
discrimination, is to conceptualise discrimination as concerned with addressing stigma.50 
Solanke uses the concept of stigma to better understand when characteristics should be 
protected from discrimination, proposing that equality law should aim to remove the stigma 
that attaches to particular characteristics and results in disapproval and social opprobrium or 
contempt. She argues that stigma is not only the result of individual face to face social 
processes, but can be institutional and structural, with roots in cultural practices and social 
policies. Applied in the context of age, discrimination experienced by both young and older 
workers can be understood as, at times, stigmatic. In terms of negative stereotypes,51 older 
workers can be stereotyped as less able to adapt to new ways of working, unlikely to have the 
stamina to maintain intensive levels of work, and unwilling to work for younger managers. 
Young people, for example ‘millennials,’52 are often stereotyped as unreliable, unable to take 
direction and lacking in institutional loyalty.53 Whilst much of the less favourable treatment 
experienced on the basis of age is based on stereotype, age inequality also infiltrates many 
labour market practices and social policies, with retirement and age related pay being the 
most direct examples. To the extent that these policies reflect unequal social power, they can 
be understood to reflect the stigma attached to age.  
But as Solanke shows, stigma goes beyond relying on stereotypes as it does not require any 
cognitive response from the individual. It can be ‘low, unobtrusive and genteel in its effect.’54 
It may appear to be based on kindness but can result in shunning people, leading to social 
exclusion. In the context of age discrimination this ‘genteel’ or ‘kind’ but nonetheless 
discriminatory treatment can be seen in the use of ‘dignity’ arguments to justify retirement. 
This supposedly avoids creating a humiliating environment at work, yet such treatment labels 
                                                 
50 See I Solanke, Discrimination as Stigma: A Theory of Anti-Discrimination Law (2017, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford).  
51 See for example, S Bisom-Rapp and M Sargeant, ‘Diverging Doctrine, Converging Outcomes: Evaluating 
Age Discrimination Law in the United Kingdom and the United States’ (2013) 44 Loyola University Chicago 
Law Journal 717 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154327. 
52 Those born between 1980 and 2000.  
53 See for example,  PWC report ‘Millennials at work Reshaping the workplace’ available at  
https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/services/consulting/documents/millennials-at-work.pdf (accessed 27 November 
2017). 
54 I Solanke, Discrimination as Stigma: A Theory of Anti-Discrimination Law (2017, Hart Publishing, Oxford), 
quoting R A Pinker, Social Theory and Social Policy (London, Heinemann 1971). 
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older workers as having reduced capacity and results in the removal from older workers of 
the economic and social benefits of work, resulting in reduced welfare and increased isolation 
of older people. Understanding discrimination as addressing stigma can be helpful in the 
context of age, as it helps draw attention to some forms of discrimination that could otherwise 
be hidden. Thus in the context of age equality, differential treatment on the basis of age needs 
to be examined closely to ensure that it is not overtly or unobtrusively stigmatic.  
But equally, as with the argument based on dignity, the idea that discrimination should aim to 
eradicate stigma can cut both ways. Unlike the other grounds of discrimination, in the case of 
age discrimination, the economic dimension to age equality creates a number of scenarios in 
which it may be argued that age based treatment is not the result of stigma or stereotype. It 
may be that where differential treatment does not impose stigma on the group, it will be more 
readily justified. 
Disadvantage  
An alternative aim of equality is, in Arneson’s words, ‘to promote better lives for people, 
with good quality of life fairly distributed, and fairness understood as tilting towards the 
worse off.’55 Such an approach sees the wrong of discrimination as being in the way it causes 
disadvantage, rather than in terms of expressive harm. One of the consequences of aiming at 
redressing disadvantage, or more radically, redistributing wealth, is that it allows for 
asymmetric protection, focussed on improving the lot of the disadvantaged group or person, 
rather than on treating both parties in the same way. 
Tackling disadvantage goes beyond economic disadvantage, and can be understood to include 
differential access, caused by membership of a protected group, to enjoyment of the more 
general good of human flourishing.56 Thus the disadvantage may not only be reduced 
economic opportunities such as access to work, but also can caused by reductions in self-
esteem. In effect, concepts such as stigma and dignity can thus be viewed through a lens of 
disadvantage, rather than as separate aims of equality.  
As was seen in relation to dignity and stigma, there are correlations between age and a level 
of disadvantage in terms of an ability to live a flourishing life, both for older and younger 
people;57 and the link between economic disadvantage and age was identified above, under 
the economic dimension. For example, there is some correlation between age and economic 
disadvantage, with high rates of under- and unemployment for young people leading to 
reduced incomes, and increased longevity leading to poverty in old age.58 However, the 
correlation of poverty with older ages is not direct. Indeed, some over-65s enjoy better 
financial status not only than those of other age groups but better financial status that later 
generations are ever likely to enjoy. Thus, it cannot be assumed that higher levels of wealth 
enjoyed towards the end of life are an inevitable product of changes over a life time, and thus 
justified because they are available to all in turn.  
Moreover, as suggested above, not all disbenefits that may be linked to age are stigmatic or 
infringe dignity. Some merely reflect the economic dimensions of age equality, and are aimed 
                                                 
55 R Arneson, ‘Discrimination, Disparate Impact and Theories of Justice’ in D Hellman and S Moreau, 
Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford, OUP, 2013).  
56 T Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (Oxford, OUP, 2015). 
57 See further A L Goldman ‘Age Discrimination Law – A Perspective from the USA’ in F Hendrickx (ed) 
Active Ageing and Labour Law (2012, Intersentia, Cambridge).  
58 See Income Poverty in Old Age: An Emerging Development Priority, UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Programme on Ageing, available at:  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/documents/PovertyIssuePaperAgeing.pdf accessed 30/10/17 
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to avoid some of the repercussions of a labour market which embeds age into its structures, 
such as redundancy schemes and pay scales. Indeed, disadvantage is usually understood to 
include the historic and systemic disadvantages suffered by groups, often based on 
historically entrenched stigma. In the context of age, this may be where the fact that 
individuals’ ages are subject to change gains purchase within the aims of non-discrimination 
law, because the experience of the group and of the individual do not correspond directly.  
Stereotypes based on age can act to the detriment of older workers. Such stereotypes are long 
standing, and the resulting detriment can be understood to be systemic and historic; it can be 
viewed as group disadvantage because it is suffered by older workers because of their 
membership of the category of ‘older workers’. However, each individual claimant will not 
have experienced disadvantage in a systemic way, as they will have had periods of their lives 
when they were not subject to the detriment.59 This is in contrast to other protected groups 
whose group and individual experiences of disadvantage is constant and can therefore be 
understood to be systemic. The application of concepts such as systemic or historic as 
multipliers of disadvantage is thus problematic in the case of age.60  
In effect, correctly identifying where disadvantage on grounds of age arises creates a constant 
challenge where equality law is based on the aim of redressing disadvantage, with an 
associated danger that action that aims to tackle disadvantage will be colonised by the more 
advantaged members of the group.61 In the context of age, this can be seen in the increased 
use of age equality laws by older white men in the US, noted above.62  
However, the fact that disadvantage is not directly correlated to age does not mean that 
equality law should not direct its attention to redressing disadvantage where there is evidence 
that it is age-based. It is merely to note that care needs to be taken when using disadvantage 
in the context of age equality, as age cannot be used as an accurate proxy for disadvantage.  
Moreover, even where a correlation can be seen between economic disadvantage and age, it 
is not clear how much weight it should be given when it is the result of individual 
circumstances including past choices, rather than systemic disadvantage suffered throughout 
life, as with other protected characteristics. Sometimes, age related disadvantage will be 
connected to systemic disadvantage: for example, as was pointed out above, some women 
may suffer an economic disadvantage if they have taken time out from work to bring up 
children; or they may have reached the upper levels of promotion fairly late on in their 
careers, meaning that they have not had a fair ‘crack at the whip’ when it comes to career 
progression. Yet, there will be cases where an individual suffers economic detriment and 
poor financial security for reasons that give rise to less concern. For example, a person may 
lack pension provision because they cashed in their pension funds to buy a car,63 or to spend 
                                                 
59 See the discussion of the complete life view of equality in R Horton, ‘Justifying Age Discrimination in the 
EU’ in U Belavusau and K Henrard, EU Anti-Discrimination Law beyond Gender (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2018). 
60 E. Pontz, ‘What a difference ADEA makes: why disparate impact theory should not apply to Age 
Discrimination Act’ (1995-6) 74 NCL Rev 267.  
61 Barmes, Equality Law and Experimentation: The Positive Action Challenge (2009) 68 CLJ 623. 
62 G. Rutherglen, ‘From Race to Age: the Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law (1995) 24(2). 
The Journal of Legal Studies 491; J N Lahey, International Comparison of Age Discrimination Laws (2010) 32 
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on lavish holidays; or conditions may arise that are not chosen, but which are not connected 
to protected characteristics, such as family breakdown, which can have serious negative 
impacts on family finances. It would clearly be invidious for employers or courts to assess 
such personal circumstances when assessing whether discrimination can be justified, but 
equally it may be inadequate to simply assume that any economic disadvantage faced by an 
older person should be ‘compensated’ by allowing the older worker’s interests to be given 
priority over the interests of younger workers. None of this is to say that the law should not 
aim to redress some of the disadvantages faced by older workers, it is merely to note that the 
issue is complex and contains internal contradictions. As a result, while disadvantage may 
play a useful role as part of a matrix of concerns to which non-discrimination law should 
have regard, it should not be assumed to take priority over other aims for discrimination 
law.64  
Inclusion 
A further aim for equality law is that of social inclusion and participation in society, both 
political participation and inclusion in community and society more generally.65 The idea of 
social inclusion as an additional aim for equality is suggested by Collins,66 for whom the idea 
has a clear redistributive purpose. In Collins’ view, a focus on social inclusion can help 
overcome some of the problems, identified above, with the equality law having as its aim the 
preservation of dignity or eradication of disadvantage. Collins’ focus on social inclusion 
moves away from a concern with equalising treatment, and aims instead to meet minimum 
levels of wellbeing for all. Wellbeing in this context extends beyond economic and physical 
wellbeing, to include an ability to engage meaningfully in social life, including public life and 
work. As with the focus on stigma and dignity, the concept involves extending our 
understanding of the wrongs of age discrimination beyond the economic, but nonetheless, the 
focus remains on structural and systemic disadvantage.67 The social inclusion model focusses 
both on positive action to achieve greater distributive justice, but also encourages the 
participation of minority groups in civic life, so that their voice within the community can 
become stronger, thereby reducing their marginalisation. Both Fraser68 and Fredman69 
advocate full participation in society as an aim of equality, as a mechanism for increasing 
social justice. They suggest that fuller and more substantive conceptions of equality would 
involve working to increase participation in decision making by members of out-groups. This 
can include greater participation in the political sphere, to ensure that the voice of 
marginalised groups is properly heard in our democratic processes. Anderson reaches similar 
conclusions in her review of the aims of equality, with her suggestion that the focus of non-
discrimination should be on institutional arrangements that generate people’s opportunities 
rather than on creating an even distribution of goods.70   
Applying such arguments in the context of age leads yet again to a degree of contradiction. 
On the one hand, the political voice of some older and younger people, especially those 
experiencing poverty and social disadvantage caused by stigma and stereotyping may be 
                                                 
64 See E Anderson, ‘What is the point of Equality?’ (1999) 109(2) Ethics 287 on the problems for equality law 
when effectively based on ‘luck egalitarianism’.  
65 S Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 712. 
66 H Collins, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 MLR 16. 
67 Applied in the context of age, this leads Collins to focus his concern on those over 55 and under 22 as these 
are the groups that suffer from structural and systemic disadvantage. 
68 N Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age’ (1995) New 
Left Review 1/212 68. 
69 S Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 712. 
70 E Anderson, ‘What is the point of equality?’ (1999) 109(2) Ethics 287. 
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excluded from our democratic processes if they lack the confidence or self-esteem to 
participate. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence from voting patterns that older 
people as a group do not lack voice in the political process.71 Indeed, it can be argued that 
their voice is disproportionate in the democratic process, with the result that policy is often 
directed towards serving the interests of older voters. This suggests that at least in terms of 
democratic processes, age does not correlate with a lack of participation in political terms.  
Thus, to the extent that age can lead to marginalisation either in terms of participation directly 
in politics or in wider processes of social life, inclusion can provide a useful dimension of 
equality law. Our understanding of equality can be helpfully expanded by an appreciation that 
where stereotypical or stigmatic assumptions based on age lead individuals to be excluded 
from work, broader social exclusion will occur. However, there is some danger is assuming 
that age is a reliable proxy for marginalisation, so while a focus on inclusion is useful to 
provide a broad understanding of the wrongs of discrimination, it should be used with caution 
in relation to age, and with due regard for the varied contexts in which it operates.  
Accommodation  
Fredman’s fourth dimensional principle of equality is to ‘respect and accommodate 
difference, removing the detriment but not the difference itself’, which involves changing 
existing social structures to accommodate difference, rather than requiring everyone to 
conform to the dominant norm.72 Fredman argues that accommodation, a concept used in the 
context of disability discrimination, can usefully be incorporated into our understanding of 
equality on other grounds, with its emphasis on addressing structures which give rise to 
disadvantage, whether that is in terms of the physical structures of workplaces, or work rules 
and other practices that may place groups at a disadvantage. Examples may be requirements 
to work full time, which may disadvantage parents, or requirements to wear particular 
clothing, which may be to the detriment of religious minorities. Accommodation can refer to 
general structural change, or more narrowly to the creation of exceptions for individuals 
leaving the general rule untouched.73  
Applied in the context of age, the idea that general structures could be changed to ameliorate 
the position of older or younger workers is attractive. For example, dismantling age 
dependent structures may be helpful where they are based on stereotypical assumptions, such 
as wage structures which assume that younger worker’s financial needs are less than those of 
older workers, and redeployment schemes which assume that younger workers will not have 
dependants, assuming that they are can easily be mobile. However, more broadly, courts have 
been wary of introducing deeper structural change in relation to age. Age related rules are 
firmly embedded not only within the workplace, but also social security rules and other social 
structures. This makes creating comprehensive change extremely complex. Given the varied 
aspects of age equality, including economic dimensions and the contradictions within the 
                                                 
71 In the USA, see https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html; 
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different social dimensions, it is perhaps understandable that courts have been wary of 
requiring fundamental structural changes to employment, pension and other economic 
arrangements as a method of addressing age discrimination.74  
Despite the reluctance of courts to require generalised and systemic change to labour market 
structures in response to age discrimination, a more individualised exception based approach 
to accommodation may be of use in the context of age, akin to the duty of reasonable 
accommodation or reasonable adjustment that applies in the case of disability discrimination. 
Such an approach would require employers to justify any refusal to make individual 
adaptations to workplace rules which are needed to allow younger people or older people to 
access employment more easily. A number of examples of accommodation can be found in 
the UK. For example, the system for assessing the quality of research in UK higher education 
institutions, the Research Excellence Framework,75 uses certain metrics to measure research 
output. The metrics are adapted to allow early career researchers to submit fewer outputs, to 
take into account of the fact that they have had less time to produce research. While not 
directly linked to age, this adjustment is largely of benefit to younger academics. Older 
workers may be accommodated by allowing them to continue to progress careers even if they 
lack qualifications which are later introduced for new recruits.76 Alternatively, within the 
National Health Service, common requests for accommodation from older workers are for 
flexible working, or reduced night-working.77  
An individualised based approach to accommodation allows for exceptions to be made to 
adapt work structures to the needs of individuals. Such an approach helps address the 
individualised experience of inequality, and to that extent helps achieve the broader social 
aims of equality. Moreover, the language of reasonable accommodation as applied to age can 
help not only to address more localised concerns, but also the intersection between age 
equality and other grounds, particularly disability discrimination. However, this exception 
based approach stops short of addressing underlying causes of age inequality, and thus can be 
understood as a limited aim for age equality laws.   
Intersectionality  
The discussion above demonstrates that there are inherent contradictions both within and 
between the varied aspects of the social dimension to age equality. Age has a strong 
correlation with a number of negative social outcomes, as well as being linked to forms of 
economic disadvantage, and yet the traditional justifications for non-discrimination laws do 
not apply in a straightforward manner: the benefits and disadvantages experienced over the 
life course mean that it is not always clear who is the disadvantaged group; ‘age’ does not 
capture a discrete group that has been excluded from majoritarian political processes; and age 
is not always used in ways that infer stigma or undermine dignity.  
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One way to make the links between age and economic or social disbenefits clearer is to 
understand age equality in intersectional terms.78 Once the connections between age and 
other protected characteristics are understood, the case for protection against age 
discrimination strengthens.  
The term intersectionality was used by Crenshaw to identify the particular oppressions 
suffered by black women by virtue of being both black and women,79 although its recognition 
can be traced earlier to activists such as Sojourner Truth.80 Intersectionality goes beyond the 
recognition of the cumulative effect and mutual reinforcement of multiple discrimination, 
when individuals are disadvantaged by two or more of the protected characteristics at the 
same time. Instead, it recognises the ‘intersectional experience as a product of the 
intermeshing, or fusion, of two or more separate forms of oppression, rather than just 
simultaneous or parallel occurrences of these oppressions.’81  
An understanding of age equality through the lens of intersectionality helps identify gaps in 
the legal protection afforded to age, as well as creating additional impetus for tackling age 
discrimination. For example, the different social aims of age equality are more pressing once 
their intersection with other grounds is recognised: while there is a correlation between 
poverty and older age, it is significantly more common for older women to experience 
poverty than older men, largely due to a significant gap in pension provision;82 and additional 
stigma and negative stereotypes are directed at older women.83  
The intersections of age with gender are well established.84 Votinius85 identifies particular 
disadvantages experienced by older women: first, she shows that the ageing of the population 
has a greater impact on women as they are more likely to have been already disadvantaged in 
the workplace due to sex discrimination; this means that justifications for unequal treatment 
on the basis of age may be inapt, such as the ‘fair innings’ argument that suggests that older 
workers should give way to younger workers once a predetermined age is reached. The 
justification that is usually offered for this position is that older workers have already enjoyed 
the benefits of a full working life. But of course, women are likely to be disproportionately 
represented among those who have not, due to the higher likelihood that they will have 
interrupted their careers for child or elder care related reasons. In similar vein, stereotypes of 
age and gender may differ: women are viewed as ‘old’ from a younger age, older women are 
seen as less competent, intelligent or wise then older men; as well as being viewed as more 
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nurturing and sensitive, referencing grandmotherly stereotypes.86 In addition, the combination 
of age and gender may exacerbate existing stereotypes. For example, stereotypes about older 
people being reluctant to adopt new technology may be stronger for women, given that 
women are also stereotyped as being less technically proficient than men.87  
Another key intersection is between age and disability.88 Not only do rates of disability 
increase with age, but also many of the common requests that older workers make for 
accommodation or adjustment are very similar to requests that would otherwise be 
understood as disability claims if made by younger workers. For example, requests to avoid 
some of the peaks of intensive or unsocial working hours, or to allow sufficient recovery time 
following such work schedules could be understood as either claims based on disability, or 
where made by older workers, claims based on age. As well as clear intersections between 
age and disability, additional intersections can be found between disability, age and gender. 
For example, older women have consistently been found to have higher prevalence of 
disability than men of the same age, due to surviving longer after disabilities arise.89 Age 
intersects with other grounds in relation to ethnic origin and sexual orientation too,90 with 
young ethnic minority people suffering discriminatory treatment on grounds of ethnic 
minority or immigration status.91 
Whilst intersectionality largely creates additional impetus for tackling age equality, it may at 
times create additional forms of justification for age discrimination. For example, after the 
abolition of mandatory retirement in the UK, Oxford University retained its use of retirement 
for academic staff. One of its justifications is to help the university achieve greater diversity 
across its staffing, ‘noting that recent recruits are more diverse than the composition of the 
existing workforce, especially amongst the older age groups of the existing workforce.’92 
Legal systems differ in the extent to which they recognise the intersectional dimension to 
discrimination.93 Courts have been slow to formally recognise the more intermeshed forms of 
intersectional harm caused by discrimination, although there are some exceptions where 
courts have recognised that discrimination may arise from the intersection of different 
grounds.94 
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More limited recognition of intersectionality can be seen in the recognition by some states of 
multiple discrimination claims. However, even in this simpler form of adding together more 
than one type of discrimination the position varies. For example within the Europe, a variety 
of practices exist: multiple discrimination is explicitly recognized in Greece95 and Bulgaria;96 
the UK97 and the Netherlands do not explicitly recognise multiple discrimination; and in 
Romania98  and Austria,99 the fact that discrimination has occurred on more than one ground 
can give grounds for additional damages.  
Broad recognition of intersectional discrimination thus remains to be seen on the legal stage, 
but the concept of intersectionality is of significance to both the social and economic 
dimensions of equality law, and should enrich our understanding of the aims of equality law 
on the grounds of age.  
Conclusion 
The case for legal protection against age discrimination in the employment sphere is clear: 
age discrimination can give rise to expressive and economic harms. Disadvantageous 
treatment of older and younger workers has a number of outcomes including difficulties for 
older and young people in accessing work; detrimental treatment in work though differential 
pay; lack of career progression due to the use of stereotypes; and the premature ending of 
careers through age related redundancy schemes or compulsory retirement.   
However, the strongly detrimental impact of age discrimination only tells half the story, as 
age also plays a strong role in the structures of the employment relationship, at times aiming 
to address other forms of injustice, such as intergenerational justice whereby older workers 
may be expected to retire to make way for a younger, and at times more diverse workforce.100  
The interaction between the social and economic dimensions of age equality can be seen in 
particular in the case of retirement. In the following section, retirement serves as a case study 
of the various ways in which different aspects of age equality intersect, and as illustration of 
the contradictions that courts face when required to assess whether compulsory retirement 
can be justified.  
The intersection of the economic and social: the case of retirement  
The case for abolishing compulsory retirement can be made on both economic and social 
justice grounds. Increasing longevity and the consequent difficulties facing states in 
maintaining pension provision has led to calls for extended working lives, a clear obstacle to 
the achievement of which is the practice of compulsory retirement. Added to this forceful 
economic argument against compulsory retirement is a rights based argument which sees the 
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practice as discriminatory: it amounts to an affront to individual dignity, particularly as the 
treatment is often based on stereotypical assumptions about capacity reducing with age.101  
The case against retirement is simple and forceful, and is to be taken seriously. However, it is 
not unassailable and it is arguable that compulsory retirement can, at times, be justified. First, 
as suggested above, retirement may be justified when viewed as part of a protective labour 
market structure which provides support for workers throughout their careers, culminating in 
provision of an adequate pension. Some also justify compulsory retirement using the notions 
of a ‘fair innings’ or complete life view of age equality, as well as on the basis of 
intergenerational justice referred to above.102 The argument is that it is acceptable to expect 
older workers to make way for younger workers once a particular age is reached. The fair 
innings argument assumes that fairness should be viewed over a life time; that older workers 
who might otherwise be understood to be disadvantaged by any such requirement, have in 
fact enjoyed the same benefits in their youth. Such a view is associated with a broad social 
policy agenda of intergenerational fairness, achieved through the sharing of jobs between 
generations.  
Although relied on by some courts in age discrimination cases,103 the ‘fair innings’ idea has 
been criticised on the basis that jobs need not be rationed as the number of jobs is not 
finite.104 However, although it can be argued that more people working will result in the 
creation of more jobs, this economic model would seem to be less appropriate at the 
individual firm or sector levels: for example, although the number of jobs in higher education 
may not be finite, nonetheless, the number of positions cannot just expand to meet demand 
for jobs. Thus where senior positions remain occupied by older workers, it remains difficult 
for younger staff to gain employment or promotion.  
Although economic arguments can be deployed to suggest that the notion of a fair innings or 
intergenerational fairness can justify compulsory retirement, this will only be socially just if 
the innings have truly been ‘fair’. As referred to above in relation to the issue of incremental 
pay rates in the traditional labour market, some workers will not have had a ‘fair innings’ for 
example due to absence for family or health reasons. Equally, the extent to which any innings 
is fair may depend on where in the labour market the individual is situated, and in practice 
this can depend on their labour market position. Those who are located in the higher 
segments of the labour market,105 such as professionals with a high level of human capital, 
are likely to have an occupational pension or other savings for their retirement, and so will 
often have genuine choice as to whether to continue to work or retire. Those in low paid and 
low skill jobs have fewer options and may not have sufficient pension income to retire 
comfortably. Thus, even if it is accepted that intergenerational justice may be a legitimate 
aim, it remains far from clear whether such aims will be sufficient to justify mandatory 
retirement in any given case.  
Moreover, even if the arguments in favour of retirement are accepted, the basic egalitarian 
case against compulsory retirement, that it amounts to age discrimination, remains to be 
answered. To a degree, these concerns can be met, as the social dimension of age equality is 
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not as robust as it might seem. For example, as discussed above, arguments for age equality 
based on dignity and disadvantage are weakened when age based differences in treatment are 
not used as signifiers of contempt for older workers, but are based on the understanding of 
the job as an economic asset, which should be distributed fairly between the generations in 
order to address economic disadvantage faced by younger workers.106 However, the social 
arguments against differential treatment on the basis of age remain robust, leading difficulty 
for national courts when determining the outcome of cases involving retirement.   
Connecting the social and economic   
The various dimensions of age equality have been shown to be complex and at times 
internally contradictory. Changes in demographics mean that age is used as a key category in 
addressing institutional responses to economic challenges caused by the ageing population. 
At the same time, age equality also has an individual aspect, in terms of its role in leading to 
dignitary harm to the individual. In effect, age equality can be understood to have both 
individual and institutional features.  
An additional aspect of the economic dimension to age equality is identified by Somek,107 
who notes that by removing the barriers which can stop people working, equality law acts as 
a corrective to the neoliberal turn in economics and social policy. In effect, as the workplace 
increasingly operates within a market framework, it is necessary to remove barriers on the 
participation of vulnerable groups within the market. Given the increasing flexibilisation of 
work and the move to more precarious forms of work, the discrimination agenda can thus be 
understood as a mechanism to soften what might otherwise become a fairly brutal labour 
market system with little room to accommodate any vulnerability. The assumption is that 
once the corrective of anti-discrimination law is applied, the market can then be left to 
operate with minimal further state intervention.108  
Much of the impetus for introducing anti-discrimination laws for age has, indeed, been driven 
by economic imperatives to increase labour market participation, and it may well be the case 
that age equality laws result in a bolstering of reliance on a free labour market by removing 
some of its inefficiencies and inequities. In effect, the broad impact of age discrimination 
within the labour market provides strong reasons to give effective regard to the economic 
dimension to equality law as means to create fairer distribution of economic goods. 
Nonetheless it also remains the case that the gains of anti-discrimination law are felt well 
beyond the economic sphere. Whilst economic imperatives may be a major driver of change 
towards a more age-equal society, the resulting changes have significant non-economic 
benefits in terms of progress towards a more equal society in broader terms.  
Thus, the two dimensions of age equality, the social and the economic need to be seen in 
tandem. Indeed, it may well be helpful to see the different dimensions as intersectional rather 
than additive. A full appreciation of the aims of age equality requires more than the addition 
of the various harms under different headings. Instead, they need to be understood to be 
interwoven in a more complex manner. On the one hand, the different dimensions sometimes 
work cumulatively to create additional elements of harm. On the other hand, they can also cut 
across and undermine each other, leading to justification of differential treatment.   
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A framework for achieving a legal approach to age equality drawing on the intersection 
between its social and economic aims, without creating any priority between them, and 
without merely seeing the two dimensions as additive, is suggested by Fredman’s approach to 
understanding substantive equality. In her 2016 article Substantive Equality Revisited,109 she 
uses the four-dimensional analytic framework of equality discussed above to better illuminate 
the nature of inequality, and assist in determining the outcome of cases. Fredman’s focus is 
on the interaction of the different dimensions of equality, using the synergies and synthesis 
between them to help resolve difficult cases. Thus, she suggests that furthering dignity should 
not be at the expense of redressing disadvantage; and that affirming identity should be 
circumscribed by the need to prevent stigma, stereotyping and prejudice.110 In effect, the 
different dimensions of equality can be used to buttress one another and better address the 
weaknesses of each.111  
Such a multi-layered approach can be useful as courts seek to steer a course through the 
different aspects of age equality, and such an approach is compatible with the legal 
frameworks based on proportionality.112 At times, the main aim of the law may be to respond 
to the economic needs of demographic change. This may justify some structural changes to 
facilitate greater participation in work by older or younger workers. At other times, the 
purpose of age discrimination law may be to address dignitary and stigma harms, such as 
where individuals are harassed or subjected to other detriments due to age related 
stereotyping. Accepting a range of aims and purposes for age discrimination law, in 
recognition of the varied dimensions of age inequality, should lead to nuanced and flexible 
legal responses.  
Of course, the use of a multi-dimensional approach to age equality cannot resolve the many 
contradictions and complexities raised above in the discussion of the social, economic and 
structural aspects of age equality. Indeed, there are times when the different dimensions do 
not result in the buttressing or strengthening of protection against age discrimination, but 
rather the different dimensions may explain and justify limits placed on non-discrimination. 
For example, despite the fact that the dignity dimensions to age equality may suggest that 
differential treatment on the basis of age should be unlawful, the economic dimension may 
lead to a different conclusion in the case of retirement, or age based wage structures. Even 
here though, the position is not clear cut: intersectional aspects of such decisions can play a 
role, even though this role may lead to some contradictory results. In the case of retirement an 
intersectional approach may reveal that retirement can create particular hardship for women 
who have built up insufficient pension income; but equally, an intersectional approach may 
suggest that retirement can be justified if it is used to create a more diverse workforce.113  
The use of a multi-dimensional approach to resolving cases of age discrimination is thus 
unlikely to lead to conclusive answers on how to reconcile the various conflicting interests in 
play. Instead, recognition of the different dimensions of age equality creates a set of 
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evaluative criteria for determining the proper parameters of laws upholding or promoting age 
equality. The approaches of courts in a range of jurisdictions will be explored in the next 
chapters in order to identify the extent to which the difficulties courts face in age 
discrimination cases can be understood as caused by the existence of overlapping and 




Chapter 2 - Comparative study  
Having examined the multi-faceted challenges facing courts in approaching age equality, this 
chapter turns to consider the law in a number of states regarding the prohibition of age 
discrimination. The study aims to cover the law of the global north and south, but the focus is 
largely on states where the law has developed in more detail. A number of states such as 
India, Japan, China Egypt and Nigeria have no generalised protection against age 
discrimination, although non-legal measures may address age equality.114  
The law of the various states is first described in general terms. Attention is then focused on 
discrimination against younger workers, discrimination against older workers in general, and 
any the special treatment of retirement.   
International standards 
Age is not an enumerated ground of equality in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
nor is there any dedicated international treaty for the eradication of age discrimination. 
However, to the extent that age discrimination may include elements of intersectional 
discrimination, international conventions such as the Convention for the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women may be of relevance. Some international human rights 
instruments include references to age in their lists of discrimination, such as the International 
Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In addition, where international 
conventions include clauses prohibiting discrimination on a number of grounds including 
‘other status’, age has been recognised as included.115  
A number of non-binding political instruments have been developed to address the 
disadvantage experienced by both older and younger people: for example, the Vienna 
International Plan of Action on Ageing was adopted at the World Assembly on Ageing in 
1982, followed by the 1991 United Nations Principles for Older Persons, the 1992 Global 
Targets on Ageing for the Year 2001 and the 1992 Proclamation on Ageing. The Political 
Declaration and the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, 2002, was adopted at the 
Second World Assembly on Ageing, and endorsed by the General Assembly.116 In 2010 the 
Open-Ended Working Group on Ageing was established by the UN General Assembly, to 
identify possible gaps in the existing international framework of the human rights of older 
persons and how best to address them. 
Although not directly enforceable, such policy instruments may be of use to courts in 
interpreting and applying the law in cases of age discrimination. However, overall, in terms 
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of the fundamental rights legal regime, age equality does not directly feature in the 
framework of international human rights protection.117  
Despite the absence of an international treaty prohibiting age discrimination, it is directly 
prohibited under regional legal frameworks such as within the EU legal system, discussed 
next. 
The EU legal framework on age discrimination  
The first step in prohibiting age discrimination in the EU was the introduction in 1997118 of a 
new Article 6a to the Treaty on European Union, permitting the EU to take appropriate action 
to combat discrimination on a number of grounds including age. The resulting Equal 
Treatment Framework Directive 2000/78/EC included provisions related to age, and is 
considered below. In addition, age is included in the protection for equality found in the 
Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,119 and following the introduction of age 
equality in the Framework Directive, equality on grounds of age was recognised as a general 
principle of EU law in the case of Mangold.120  
The protection against age discrimination is contained in Directive 2000/78. It applies to age 
in general, rather than being restricted to those of any particular age. Anyone of any age can 
make a claim in comparison with a person of a different age, and the protection is not 
directed only to the needs of older or younger workers. Recital 11 sets out the aims of age 
equality, and notes that age equality, as well as aiding the attainment of a high level of 
employment, social protection and quality of life, can also aid economic and social cohesion, 
and solidarity.121 While age equality shares these features with other equality grounds, the 
Directive also recognizes that age discrimination is different, with special recitals applying to 
age only: age discrimination can be justified by legitimate employment policy,122 and 
retirement ages can be retained.123  
The Directive prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of age.124 In 
common with other grounds, indirect discrimination can be justified where there is a 
legitimate aim for any provision criterion or practice based on age, and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. Also in common with other grounds, direct 
discrimination can be justified where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational 
activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, age constitutes a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the 
requirement is proportionate.125  
In contrast to the protection on other grounds, additional exceptions apply with respect to age 
equality, allowing direct discrimination to be justified. Article 6 provides:  
Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not 
constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they are objectively 
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and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, 
labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary. 
Such differences of treatment may include, among others: 
(a) the setting of special conditions on access to employment and vocational training, 
employment and occupation, including dismissal and remuneration conditions, for 
young people, older workers and persons with caring responsibilities in order to 
promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection; 
(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional experience or seniority in 
service for access to employment or to certain advantages linked to employment; 
(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is based on the training 
requirements of the post in question or the need for a reasonable period of 
employment before retirement. 
Thus, the EU framework for the protection against age discrimination reflects the multi-
dimensional nature of age equality. In effect, the contradictions inherent in age equality, 
discussed in Chapter 1 above, are reflected in the strong commitment to age equality found in 
EU law, alongside recognition that age discrimination, including direct discrimination, can be 
justified. In particular, the economic dimension of age equality is reflected in the acceptance 
in the Directive of labour market needs and employment policy as potential justifications for 
age discrimination. However, it should be noted that direct age discrimination can only be 
justified for ‘social policy objectives, such as those related to employment policy, the labour 
market or vocational training….those legitimate aims are distinguishable from purely 
individual reasons particular to the employer’s situation, such as cost reduction or improving 
competitiveness.’126 
Whilst accepting employment policy related aims as potentially legitimate, the CJEU has 
recognised that such aims can be easy to assert and difficult to prove. In one of its early cases, 
the Court pointed out the need for caution in this regard, as ‘mere generalisations concerning 
the capacity of a specific measure to contribute to employment policy, labour market or 
vocational training objectives are not enough to show that the aim of that measure is capable 
of justifying derogation from that principle and do not constitute evidence on the basis of 
which it could reasonably be considered that the means chosen are suitable for achieving that 
aim’.127 In effect, then, an assertion that a measure serves a legitimate aim, as listed in the 
Directive, is insufficient of itself to justify less favourable treatment on the basis of age.  
The extent to which the CJEU has had regard to the interplay of different aspects of age 
equality will be explored below with reference first to younger people.  
Discrimination against younger people.  
Discrimination against younger people can be both social and structural: stereotypical 
attitudes of employers can result in disadvantage, and labour market structures such as 
seniority based pay schemes can also result in disadvantage. Where age discrimination is the 
result of stereotypical and negative assumptions about being of a younger age, it can be 
challenged as directly discriminatory, and would not be justifiable under the provisions of the 
Directive. However, where discrimination is more structural, Article 6 of Directive 2000/78 
provides explicit justification for some types of adverse treatment of younger workers, such 
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as different remuneration conditions for young people to promote their vocational integration 
or ensure their protection, and the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional 
experience or seniority in service for access to employment or to certain advantages linked to 
employment.  
Although differential treatment of younger workers is provided for by the Directive, the 
CJEU sets reasonably high standards of justification for any such discriminatory practices.  
For example, in Kücükdeveci128 a notice period was used for dismissal calculated on the basis 
of length of service, but ignoring employment before the age of 25. The CJEU rejected the 
employer’s arguments and found the notice periods discriminatory. The reasons put forward 
by the employer were that it allowed flexibility to employers with respect to younger 
workers, given that these workers would find it easier to be mobile in terms of finding new 
work. The fact that this structural rule was based on a stereotype regarding the mobility of 
younger people meant that it could not be justified.  
A common scenario in which younger workers can be subject to age discrimination is where 
age is used to set pay scales. Here the court has taken a varied approach, depending on 
whether the pay scale relies directly on age, and whether the reasons for the differential result 
according to age can be justified for other reasons. For example, in Hennigs129 the court did 
not allow the setting of basic pay by reference to an employee’s age. However, where pay 
increments are awarded according to length of service, they can be lawful. For example, 
where differential pay rates are designed to reward loyalty and experience, they can be 
justified. However, providing higher pay at a particular age on the basis that older employees 
have additional financial needs was not justified: there was no evidence that young 
employees would not have family commitments, and older workers could have few such 
commitments.130 In effect, to the extent that the different pay rates relied on stereotypes 
regarding financial needs at different ages, it could not be justified, but where length of 
service has a link to experience or other labour market reasons, it can be reasonably easily 
justified.131 For example, in Odar v Baxter Deutschland GmbH132 the CJEU accepted that the 
calculation of redundancy payments with reference to age could be justified. In this case, 
redundancy payments reduced as workers got closer to pension age, and the CJEU accepted 
that this was justified by the legitimate aim of protecting younger workers and helping their 
integration into employment.  
Before an incremental pay scheme can be justified, it is also necessary to establish a link 
between the pay scheme and the aim pursued. In Hütter v Technische Universität Graz133 the 
Court considered an age based pay scheme which discounted any time spent working or 
training before the age of 18. The aim for the exclusion of experience gained at a younger age 
was to ensure that there was no disadvantage for those who stayed in education for longer 
(thereby losing the chance to build up years of service); and to promote young people’s entry 
into the labour market. The CJEU accepted that these aims were potentially justifiable but 
held that, because better ways to integrate young people could be identified, the scheme was 
not an appropriate means of achieving the aims.  
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In similar vein, the CJEU accepted as potentially legitimate a number of aims for an age 
discriminatory rule in Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v Antonino Bordonaro.134 Here, Italian 
law allowed a flexible form of employment similar to zero hours contracts to be offered to 
workers under 25 and over 55. Bordonaro was employed on such a contract until he turned 35 
at which time his employment was ended. He claimed that this was discriminatory on 
grounds of age. The CJEU held that the Italian government’s aims for the rule were 
potentially legitimate: promoting flexibility in the job market, fostering access for young 
people to the labour market and providing first employment opportunities for young people. 
The CJEU then left it to the national court to decide whether these aims were appropriate and 
necessary in light of its more detailed knowledge of the domestic legal landscape. In leaving 
much to the national court’s discretion the CJEU did point out that while increased flexibility 
in the labour market may be a legitimate aim, it can be difficult to see why the burden of 
realising flexibility should be borne only by particular age groups; equally, it pointed out the 
need for a logical relationship of suitability and coherence between the aims and the means 
chosen to achieve those aims. Here, it questioned whether giving access to the labour market 
for one group (those under 25) whilst denying it to another (25-55 year olds) really could 
enhance recruitment, or whether instead it merely shifted the problem of unemployment onto 
another group of workers. While the Court made clear that the discrimination might be 
difficult to justify, and that aims and the means by which they are achieved need to correlate, 
the Court stopped short of determining whether the age based rules were justified on their 
facts, leaving this crucial question to the national courts.  
A second issue that has arisen in relation to the age implications of pay schemes has been that 
of protecting employees’ acquired rights. This raises age equality issues, as those who have 
acquired rights are likely to be older than those who have not. Sometimes changes to terms 
and conditions reduce their quality, but at other times changes are introduced to remove 
discriminatory terms, such as age related benefits. Where employers wish to amend terms and 
conditions of employment they can end up eroding employee’s acquired rights or treating 
younger workers less favourably. This scenario was addressed in Specht and ors v Land 
Berlin,135 in which as salary scheme was changed so that experience was used, instead of age, 
in setting pay. Existing staff were kept on the old age-based salary system, so as to preserve 
their acquired rights. This was challenged on the basis that the new system was age 
discriminatory because it perpetuated the old discriminatory system. The CJEU held that 
although the old age-based salary system was discriminatory, and its continuance in the new 
scheme was therefore also potentially discriminatory, the new system was justified. The new 
system was introduced with the aim of protecting the acquired rights of existing staff and had 
been accepted by the trade unions: its aims were legitimate and the means of achieving them 
were appropriate and necessary.  
In sum, although age discrimination against younger workers is outlawed by the Directive on 
equal terms with age discrimination against older workers, structural discrimination does 
seem to be reasonably readily justified. Article 6(1) itself sets out explicitly examples of 
discriminatory practice that can be accepted, including setting of special conditions on access 
to employment and vocational training, separate remuneration and actions to promote 
integration in the workplace. This allows employers to continue with many age 
discriminatory practices such as setting pay with regard to experience, and awarding lower 
redundancy payments to younger workers. However, the CJEU has required employers to 
show a link between the legitimate aim pursued by a pay scheme and the means employed to 
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achieve it, requiring that the means be necessary and appropriate. The Court has also been 
careful to ensure that stereotypical assumptions and prejudicial attitudes cannot be used to 
justify discrimination against younger workers.  
Discrimination against older workers in general 
As with discrimination against younger workers, the Directive prohibits reliance by 
employers on stereotypical or prejudicial assumptions about older workers. In addition, some 
specific types of workplace practice may disadvantage older workers, such as requirements 
that individuals be below a particular age to participate in training, and these too will need to 
be justified. This is specifically covered by Article 6 (1)(c) which states that fixing a 
maximum age for recruitment based on the training requirements or the need for a reasonable 
period of employment before retirement can be justified.  
As with discrimination on other grounds, any claims for justification do need to be applicable 
on the facts, and the CJEU has paid fairly close regard to claims involving maximum 
recruitment ages for the purposes of training. In Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main136 the fire 
service imposed a maximum age of 30 for the recruitment of fire fighters on the basis that 
this was necessary to guarantee its operational capacity and proper functioning. Evidence was 
produced showing a diminution with age in respiratory capacity, musculature and endurance, 
particularly over the age of 45, and by 50 fire fighters no longer have the capacity for 
rescuing people. Although those over 45 could continue to work for the service on less 
onerous duties, it was felt necessary to require staff to start their career younger so as to give 
the fire service the benefit of a substantial period of service at full physical capacity, before 
being moved to other roles, and so to ensure full operational capacity for the fire service. 
Given the objective data on which the employer’s position was based, the CJEU upheld the 
age-related rule. The aims were legitimate as linked to operational capacity, and the 
imposition of an age limit did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve that objective. 
The need for a clear assessment of the facts before an age based policy on recruitment will be 
justified is confirmed in two later cases involving age limits on recruitment in the police. In 
Mario Vital Pérez v Ayuntamiento de Oviedo137 recruitment to the police officers was limited 
to those under 30. The CJEU accepted that the rule served a legitimate aim of meeting 
training requirements and the need for a reasonable period of employment before 
retirement or transfer, however, a lack of evidence that these aims were met by the 
otherwise discriminatory rule meant that the rule was not upheld. In contrast, in Gorka 
Salaberria Sorondo v Academia Vasca de Policia y Emergencias, a maximum age of 35 for 
recruitment into the Basque Police and Emergency Services Academy was justified. The 
police academy had evidence of a decline in operational capacity after the age of 40, 
necessitating an earlier career start. Moreover, the nature of the role involved more physical 
roles with a higher degree of operational activity which could imply recourse to physical 
force.138 In this respect, it could be contrasted with Vital Pérez where the local policing role 
was not so physical and included directing traffic and performing administrative tasks. These 
cases show that a clear evidence base is necessary if discrimination in recruitment is to be 
justified. 
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A further type of discrimination experienced by older workers relates to reduced access to 
benefits due to the proximity to retirement. Toftgaard139 concerned a Danish law which 
allows for the award of three years ‘availability pay’ to civil servants in case of redundancy, 
in order to retain a pool of available staff in case of an increased demand. The aim of 
‘availability pay’ is to enable the restructuring of the public administration by maintaining the 
availability of civil servants whilst at the same time protecting civil servants from undue 
personal and political pressure. However ‘availability pay’ is not paid to those over 
pensionable age, who are less likely to be under such pressure as they have alternative means 
of financial support, and equally are unlikely to be looking for alternative work if it were to 
become available. The CJEU upheld the claim that the rules are discriminatory on the basis of 
age. The rules did have a legitimate aim but the means used to achieve the aim were not 
necessary, as the same objective could be achieved in a less discriminatory way. For 
example, staff of pensionable age could have been given a choice to either take pension, or to 
temporarily sacrifice pension and elect instead to take availability pay and make themselves 
available to work. 
The case of retirement 
The use of a state retirement age, although clearly based on age, is not of itself prohibited by 
Directive 2000/78, which applies without prejudice to national provisions laying down 
retirement ages.140 However, despite the exclusion of state retirement ages from the coverage 
of the Directive, retirement cases have featured heavily in the CJEU case law. This is because 
the Directive still applies to the termination of employment once retirement ages are 
reached.141 Thus, if employers rely on state retirement ages to terminate employment, this 
will amount to direct discrimination.  In effect, then, mandatory retirement provisions applied 
by employers will still require justification under Article 6 of the Directive.142  
Retirement is not mentioned in the justifications for different treatment listed in Article 6. 
However, the list is not exhaustive and in any event contains some broad categories, such as 
‘legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives’. For 
example, using these objectives, the CJEU accepted that a default retirement age of 65 can be 
justified in order to enable employers to manage workforce planning, and allowed member 
states a level of discretion in defining legitimate employment or social policy aims even 
where not included in the Article 6(1) list.143 As long as the aims relate to social policy with a 
public interest nature, rather than ‘individual reasons particular to the employer's situation, 
such as cost reduction or improving competitiveness’, they could be potentially legitimate 
aims. Moreover, the Court has allowed for a certain degree of flexibility for employers in 
pursuing these aims,144 suggesting a fairly low level of scrutiny will be given by the Court in 
retirement cases. Indeed, the brief review of some of the CJEU cases which follows, reveals 
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that while the Court has continued to review retirement provisions, requiring that they be 
justified, it has not challenged many mandatory retirement schemes.   
Felix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA145 was the first retirement case heard by 
the CJEU. Mr Palacios de la Villa challenged his retirement under an agreement which 
provided for a retirement age of 65, subject to the condition that retirement would only be 
enforced if workers had made sufficient contributions to be able to retire on a full pension. 
The CJEU confirmed that retirement was covered by the Directive and that high standards of 
justification would be required. However it then found that the mandatory retirement 
provision was justified as its aim was legitimate: promoting better access to employment by 
means of better distribution of work among different generations. Thus the CJEU readily 
accepted not only that the aim of redistributing work among different generations is 
legitimate, but also that retirement is an appropriate and necessary way to achieve this aim. 
This has been confirmed in much of the CJEU case law,146 and reflects a clear recognition by 
the Court of the economic and structural dimensions of age equality, based on the 
demographic aspects of age discrimination, as discussed above.  
However, despite the fairly ready acceptance of retirement in the case, the Court has imposed 
a level of scrutiny of the justification for age discrimination, requiring that claims made by 
the employer be justified on their facts. For example, in Palacios the Court gave weight to the 
fact that the retirement provisions were contained in a collective agreement and only applied 
where full pension had accrued. The fact that Mr Palacios had accrued a full pension was 
therefore a relevant factor in determining the proportionality of the retirement provision.  
Although, following Palacios, it could be that mandatory retirement would be hard to justify 
in the absence of collective agreements and adequate pension provision, later retirement cases 
have not taken such an approach, and have instead allowed for mandatory retirement to be 
justified even where the individual concerned had little pension provision. Thus in the very 
similar case of Rosenbladt,147 mandatory retirement was allowed, even though the pension 
provision available was much lower as Ms Rosenbladt’s hours were much lower: the CJEU 
still accepted that retirement was objectively justified, as its aim was the better distribution of 
work between the generations, and in the context that retirement was only imposed where 
there was eligibility for a pension. The Court upheld the necessity and appropriateness of the 
agreement despite the fact that when applied to Ms Rosenbladt personally, her pension 
provision was insufficient for her needs. The Court recognized the limitations of the 
justifications on the facts, but equally recognized that member states require some discretion 
in the area of social policy.  
Again the Court has continued to give weight to the labour market and economic policy 
dimensions to age equality in its reasoning, rather than focusing on its impact on the 
individual. The employment policy aim of balancing the interests of older workers against 
those of younger workers is usually based on assumptions that the older workers will already 
have accrued pension and so can afford to hand over the job to younger workers whose 
financial need is greater. Given that this was not the case in Ms Rosenbladt’s case, the Court 
could have considered whether it was proportionate to implement the retirement provision in 
her individual case, but instead it upheld the general provision regarding mandatory 
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retirement. Similarly, in in Hörnfeldt v Meddelande148 a part time worker challenged a rule 
requiring retirement at 67, but the CJEU upheld the blanket rule on retirement: although 
compulsory retirement resulted in some hardship to the individual because of his individual 
pension level, it was still proportionate.  
The reluctance of the Court to address the individual hardship that generalised retirement 
rules can cause is perhaps unsurprising considering how complex such an assessment could 
become given the range of individual choices that could give rise to lower income in older 
age,149 but nonetheless it would seem to confirm that the Court has not addressed some of the 
social and intersectional dimensions to age discrimination.  
Yet, despite this tendency to maintain existing labour market structures, the Court has set 
higher standards when tackling the use of stereotypes by employers in implementing 
retirement schemes. Thus, where legitimate aims for retirement have a discriminatory basis, 
they have not always been found to be justified. In particular, the Court has been reluctant to 
accept that retirement is justified on the basis that performance declines with age. For 
example, in Petersen v Berufungsausschuss fur Zahn fur den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe150 a 
retirement age of 68 for dentists working in public health care was challenged. The 
government tried to justify the rule on the basis that that ‘general experience’ indicated that 
after the age of 68 dentists’ work performance was likely to decline; and that it was necessary 
to free up jobs and career opportunities for young dentists. This second aim was accepted by 
the CJEU, but the first was not: the assumption that performance deteriorates after the age of 
68 was based on stereotypes, and indeed there was evidence that the requirement to retire at 
68 did not apply to dentists operating in the private sector. Thus the claim that there was a 
risk to public health from older dentists was not borne out by the evidence.  
Similarly, in Prigge v Deutsche Lufthansa AG151 the Court rejected the use of stereotypical 
assumptions about deterioration of performance as justification for mandatory retirement of 
pilots at the age of 60, in accordance with a collective agreement with the aim of maintaining 
safety. This case was considered under the genuine occupational requirement exception 
contained in Article 4(1), which also requires that exceptions be justified as proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim. The Court found that retirement was not proportionate 
because international and national rules, as well as the practice of other airlines, did not 
require retirement at the age of 60. Again stereotyped assumptions regarding age and 
deteriorating performance were not allowed to justify retirement. These cases can be 
contrasted with Wolf152 and Gorka Salaberria Sorondo,153 above, where the reduction in 
capacity with age was accepted as justification for maximum ages for training, where there 
was detailed scientific data used to substantiate the claims. It could therefore be that Court 
might accept retirement as an option if backed by reliable data justifying retirement at a 
particular age, but it will not accept generalised assumptions based on stereotype.  
The CJEU has also been faced with other cases involving somewhat indirect stereotypes or 
prejudicial assumptions by employers and it has not always taken a consistent approach on 
this matter. The first more indirectly stereotyped assumption that the Court has faced involves 
the aim of ensuring a mix of ages in the workforce. For example, Georgiev v Technicheski 
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universitet – Sofia, filial Plovdiv154 involved retirement rules for academic staff in Higher 
Education. The rules in question required that staff at 65 move from permanent contracts to 
one year contracts, for a maximum of 3 years. In effect, mandatory retirement was imposed at 
68. The Court accepted that the rules could be justified for the legitimate aim of encouraging 
recruitment and retention of younger academics, but it also appeared to accept as legitimate 
the aim of ensuring ‘the quality of teaching and research by renewing the teaching staff 
through the employment of younger professors’.155 It also confirmed the importance of 
maintaining a mix of different generations in order ‘to promote an exchange of experiences 
and innovation, and thereby the development of quality of teaching and research at 
universities.’156 These latter aims seem to accept stereotypical thinking that the quality of 
teaching will be maintained by replacing older professors with younger ones. The need for a 
balance of ages was accepted again in Fuchs and Kohler v Land Hessen,157 in which the court 
accepted, among others, that the aim of establishing a balanced age structure was a legitimate 
aim for the mandatory retirement scheme. It is not always particularly clear why an age mix 
is needed. One reason could be to ensure good handover of skills, to avoid large groups of 
workers reaching pension age at the same time and opting for retirement, potentially leading 
to a skills shortage. Such reasoning may not involve veiled stereotypes. However, age mix 
can also be based on prejudicial and stereotyped assumptions about reduced skills and 
adaptability of older workers. It may also veil prejudicial preferences by students or 
customers to be served or taught by younger staff. 
A final aim for retirement ages that has been accepted by courts can also be understood to be 
an indirect form of stereotyped assumptions about a decline in performance as workers age, 
albeit disguised as a concern for their dignity.158 This is the aim of avoiding capability 
disputes at the end of working life. For example in Rosenbladt159 the CJEU accepted the aim 
of avoiding the dismissal of employees ‘on the ground that they are no longer capable of 
working, which may be humiliating for those who have reached an advanced age.’ In Fuchs 
the Court accepted as legitimate the aim of preventing ‘possible disputes concerning 
employees’ fitness to work beyond a certain age’ 160 In Hörnfeldt v Meddelande161 the CJEU 
confirmed as legitimate the aim of avoiding ‘a situation in which employment contracts are 
terminated in situations which are humiliating for elderly workers’.162 This aim is based not 
only on an assumption that performance deteriorates with age, but also that older workers are 
not likely to recognize this.  
The early case law of the CJEU asserted that although the Directive operated without 
prejudice to state retirement, it nonetheless applied to the use of retirement by employers, 
such that the implementation of retirement schemes would need to be justified as a 
proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim. However, as the case law shows, the 
potential created by the Directive to challenge the use of retirement has not been fully 
realized. The Court has been fairly ready to accept that retirement is justified on aims such as 
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intergenerational solidarity and the freeing-up of jobs for younger workers being accepted as 
legitimate. Moreover, Court has been somewhat inconsistent in its treatment of aims which 
rely on assumptions regarding a decline in performance with age; some of these have been 
rejected, such as Petersen, whilst elsewhere they have been accepted in the name of avoiding 
the risk of undignified capability proceedings late in career.163  
Conclusion on EU law on age 
The less than robust approach to tackling the age inequality that is inherent in retirement 
reflects the ambiguity in the approach of the CJEU to age discrimination more generally. The 
Court has taken a fairly generous approach to identifying legitimate aims for potential age 
discrimination in cases involving young workers as well as older workers and retirees. This 
perhaps reflects the complexity that can be seen in the case for age inequality as discussed 
above, whereby the interaction of social with economic and structural dimensions to age 
equality was seen to be complicated and at times contradictory.  
Whilst the CJEU has accepted a range of aims for age discrimination as legitimate, it has 
been more rigorous in requiring reliance on those aims to be necessary and backed by 
evidence. For example, although maximum ages for recruitment can serve a legitimate aim of 
ensuring a period working on full duties, the Court has only accepted such requirements once 
the employer has shown evidence of a decline, rather than relying on generalized 
assumptions.  
In effect, the CJEU has addressed stereotype and the reliance on prejudice, while leaving 
intact some of the more structural and institutionalised aspects of age, which are embedded 
within the labour market.164 Thus changes to retirement, and differential terms of 
employment for younger or older workers have been relatively easy to justify, with 
significant discretion left to member states in implementing the Directive. In contrast, where 
rules seem to be based on stereotypes (e.g. that capacity will decline with age, or that younger 
workers will not have dependants) the CJEU has been more willing to intervene. The CJEU 
appears to address some of the social dimensions of age equality through tackling 
stereotypes, but the more structural aspects of age discrimination (retirement, age based 
payment systems) remain.  
Whilst this can be explained as a response to the sometimes contradictory dimensions of age 
equality, the failure to fully address the social aims of age equality leaves particular groups 
more vulnerable than others. For example, the CJEU failed to address intersectional issues in 
Rosenbladt, which involved a female part timer cleaner, on low pay and in a stereotypically 
female form of work. Instead, the Court’s response to her financial difficulty was the rather 
unsympathetic observation that the provisions mandating retirement did not prevent her from 
seeking another job.165 The failure of the CJEU to address individual disadvantage, but rather 
to uphold current labour market structures suggests that the social dimension of equality loses 
out to the economic in the context of the EU law.  
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The UK response to age discrimination was at first non-statutory, with measures such as the 
Code of Practice on Age Diversity in Employment, which aimed to raise awareness about age 
discrimination, highlight the benefits of employing an age diverse workforce and reverse 
early retirement trends. These soft law measures were ineffective in themselves to address the 
multi-dimensional problem of age discrimination,166 and in 2006, the UK implemented its 
own legislation in response to the EU Equality Directive 2000/78. The Employment Equality 
(Age) Regulations 2006 prohibited direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of age, 
as well as harassment and victimization. It largely followed the Directive in allowing for 
direct discrimination to be justified where it is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. The Regulations were replaced by the Equality Act 2010, but continue to 
mirror the Equality Directive by prohibiting discrimination except where it can be justified as 
a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. While the UK courts interpret the 
Equality Act in accordance with the parent Directive, the Employment Appeal Tribunal has 
held that the level of scrutiny with which proportionality is reviewed is higher in UK 
domestic law than under the Directive, with particular reference to the need to consider 
whether there are other, less discriminatory, measures which would have achieved the 
legitimate aim.167  
The 2006 Regulations provided for a default retirement age of 65, although this particular 
approach to retirement was short-lived, as discussed below, and mandatory retirement was 
abolished in 2011. The 2006 Regulations were replaced by the Equality Act 2010, which 
includes age as a protected characteristic and so provides protection against age 
discrimination as part of its framework of protection against discrimination on a range of 
grounds.  
As well as prohibiting age discrimination, the Equality Act also allows employers to provide 
additional benefits, facilities or services such as additional pay or holiday entitlement to 
accrue with each year of service, up to a period of five years. If benefits are accrue over a 
longer time period they will only be lawful if the employer can justify them on the basis of 
business need.168  
Although the Equality Act covers all age groups, most of the case law has involved 
discrimination against older workers, and very few have involved harassment or 
victimization.  
Discrimination against younger workers 
Outside the non-discrimination framework, the labour market in the UK continues to use age 
in relation to many of its structures. For example, the National Minimum Wage Act provides 
for lower rates of pay for younger people under 25; and reduced levels statutory redundancy 
payments for continue to be payable for younger employees, with half a week’s pay for 
employment under the age of 22, one week’s pay for employment between 22 and 41, and 
one and half week’s pay for employment over the age of 41.169  
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UK cases of discrimination against younger workers echo the cases that have arisen 
elsewhere in the EU, and have involved both reliance on stereotypes, such as assumptions of 
incompetence in younger workers,170 and less favourable terms and conditions governing 
redundancy or pay that those available to older workers.  
Both direct and indirect discrimination can be justified where proportionate, and most of the 
cases involving discrimination against younger workers have not focussed so much on the 
difference between the two types of discrimination, but rather on when and how age 
discrimination can be justified.   
In Lockwood v Department of Work and Pensions171 the claimant was paid a lower 
redundancy payment than her older colleagues. Lockwood took voluntary redundancy at the 
age of 26, and was paid around half the amount of compensation than she would have been 
had she been aged over 35, due to age related severance terms. Although the Court of Appeal 
viewed this as directly discriminatory on grounds of age, it held that it could be justified as a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The additional redundancy pay awarded 
to older workers aimed to create a ‘proportionate financial cushion until alternative 
employment is found or as a bridge into retirement’,172 and recognized both that the older 
workers were more likely to have family responsibilities, and that they might also find it 
more difficult to find alternative work. The Court of Appeal accepted that the use of age to 
act as indicative of financial need was not accurate in Lockwood’s case, but took the view 
that it was not disproportionate for the original Employment Tribunal to conclude that the 
resulting age discrimination was justified, and that it would not be practicable to assess 
severance payments on an individualized basis.173 A similar approach can be seen in 
MacCulloch v Imperial Chemical Industries plc174 where the use of age as a multiplier for the 
calculation of redundancy payments was accepted as legitimate on the basis that it 
encouraged older workers to leave, thereby creating jobs for younger workers, and that it 
reflected the fact that older workers can find it harder to find new work.  
Although in MacCulloch the EAT held that the original tribunal had not properly assessed the 
proportionality of the scheme, the case, read with Lockwood, illustrates some of the tensions 
that can arise between achieving fairness at an individual level and creating administratively 
workable systems. In addition, the fairly ready acceptance of the use of age as proxy for 
financial need demonstrates the relative ease with which age discrimination can be justified 
in the UK,175 despite the claim in Sargeant that a higher level of scrutiny of proportionality is 
applied.176  
Discrimination against older workers 
As with discrimination against younger workers, many of the discrimination cases involving 
older workers have involved age related stereotypes, such as assumptions about receptivity to 
training, and reduced physical or mental capacity. Other cases have resulted from the fact that 
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labour market structures are infused with age; for example, employers have discriminated 
against older employees in an attempt to prevent them enjoying age or service related benefits 
such as increased redundancy payments; and older staff have challenged age based rules such 
as maximum ages for training.  
Age related stereotypes  
Where employers treat older workers less favourably due to stereotyped assumptions, the 
treatment amounts to direct discrimination. One stereotypical and ageist assumption relates to 
the receptiveness of older workers to change. For example, in Dixon v Croglin Estate Co 
Ltd177 an Employment Tribunal found that age was a material factor in a decision to dismiss a 
58 year old game keeper on capability grounds. Dixon, Head Keeper for an estate, was seen 
as being responsible when the estate’s grouse shooting earnings started to fall, because in the 
employer’s view, he was ‘set in his ways’, and ‘unlikely to change’. The employer also 
suggested that he would not be able to do ‘all the GPS computer work’. The employer offered 
no justification for these comments, and the Employment Tribunal held that Dixon’s 
treatment was directly discriminatory. Similarly in the case of James v Gina Shoes178 a 58 
year old salesman was dismissed as his employer made it clear that they felt that Mr James’ 
age had ‘caused him not to meet their expectations’.  During a grievance meeting the 
employer made comments such as ‘you can’t teach an old dog new tricks’. Again, this 
treatment was found to be directly discriminatory. A further example of ageist stereotypes 
can be seen in Gomes v Henworth Limited t/a Winkworth Estate Agents,179 where the 
judgement that a 59 year old estate agent was ‘better suited to a traditional estate agency’ was 
found to have led to direct discrimination, because in the context in which it was used, the 
word ‘traditional’ was a reference to being old-fashioned and set in her ways: the word would 
not have been used of a younger employee.  
The cases show that the UK courts are fairly robust in challenging any reliance by employers 
on stereotypes and prejudicial assumptions based on age. Courts have found actions reliant on 
such assumptions to amount to direct discrimination. Although direct discrimination can 
potentially be justified, reliance on such stereotypes would be very difficult for employers to 
justify.   
Age related rules  
A second example of discrimination against older workers can be seen in relation to age 
related rules. Some of these apply to training, where older age may lead to the denial of 
access to or funding for training. Others relate to changes to workplace structures which can 
have a detrimental effect on existing workers, resulting in indirect discrimination. As with 
direct discrimination, indirect discrimination is prima facie unlawful unless it can be justified 
as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  
For example, in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police180 a new grading system 
was introduced which required a law degree in order to reach the top tier. The requirement 
was imposed on all staff, but it disadvantaged Mr Homer because he was due to retire and did 
not have sufficient time before retirement to make it worth his while undertaking the three 
years of training that would be required to achieve the highest salary tier. The Supreme Court 
held that the law degree requirement was indirectly discriminatory, and would need to be 
justified. When the case returned to the first tier Employment Tribunal the requirement was 
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found not to be justified. It had a legitimate aim (of recruiting and retaining staff of an 
appropriate calibre) and the new grading system was an appropriate and necessary way of 
achieving the aim, but nonetheless, it was not necessary to impose it on all existing legal 
advisors.  
Homer’s case also illustrates the difficulty which can arise when changes are made to terms 
and conditions of employment, as these will necessarily have an age related impact. 
However, changes are allowed where they serve a legitimate aim and are proportionate, 
which will be the case in many instances, albeit not in Homer’s; otherwise no changes to 
terms of employment could be allowed.  
Age related expense  
As discussed above, the labour market includes a number of age related rules such as 
enhanced redundancy provision, and these have been largely continued since the introduction 
of age discrimination laws. Where they have been challenged, they have been justified on the 
basis that they can provide a cushion for those who may have increased financial needs, or 
who may find it difficult to find new employment. However, whilst increased payments 
obviously benefit those to whom they are paid, the obligation to pay at a higher rate can also 
lead employers to try to avoid such payments, with resulting disadvantage to those who are 
eligible. Where employers have dismissed staff in order to avoid higher redundancy 
payments, the age discriminatory effect has been justified as a means to reduce the financial 
liabilities of the employer. This is despite the fact that costs alone are not allowed to justify 
discrimination. For example, in Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust181 an employee, 
the Chief Executive of an NHS trust, was made redundant after a work reorganisation.  His 
contract provided that if he was employed past his 50th birthday, he would be entitled to 
enhanced pension benefits that would cost his employer between £500k and £1m. The 
employer dismissed him a month before his 50th birthday, before conducting the appropriate 
consultation with him, in order to avoid paying the enhanced pension benefits. Mr Woodcock 
claimed that he had been directly discriminated against on the grounds of his age, and the 
Employment Tribunal agreed that the dismissal was timed to avoid Mr Woodcock reaching 
pensionable age. In terms of justification, the main justification was clearly to save the 
additional and considerable extra costs that were payable once Mr Woodcock reached 50.  
In terms of justification, the usual rule in discrimination is that costs alone cannot be used to 
justify discrimination.182 Here, the Court of Appeal held that the discrimination was not being 
justified on cost grounds alone: although the aim was to avoid Mr Woodcock being the 
beneficiary of a pure windfall by being in post at age 50, he was given notice for the 
additional reason that he was legitimately and genuinely being made redundant.  
A second example of the use of costs to justify age discrimination can be seen in HM Land 
Registry v Benson & Ors183 where it was accepted that an employer could base its selection 
criteria for redundancy primarily on cost. The employer wished to make as many voluntary 
redundancies as possible within a fixed budget. Workers aged 50-54 were entitled to 
extensive benefits under the Civil Service Compensation Scheme, making them much more 
expensive to make redundant. As a result, they were not chosen for redundancy. The 
employees claimed that it was discriminatory to rely on selection criteria based on the amount 
of compensation that would be paid, as it disadvantaged employees aged between 50 and 54 
who wished to be made redundant. The employer’s aim of reducing overall headcount was 
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legitimate, and there was no alternative criterion for the employer to adopt in order to achieve 
this aim. Moreover, the court noted that impact of the discriminatory criterion was not as 
severe as in many discrimination cases since the claimants did not lose their jobs, or suffer 
other benefits other than the chance to take advantage of a ‘windfall’. 
As with the case of discrimination against younger workers, these examples demonstrate that 
the UK courts are reasonably willing to justify age discrimination in situations where 
discrimination is the result of age infused labour market structures, such as age-
discriminatory pay or compensation structures cases. In contrast, a stronger line is taken 
where age stereotypes cause less favourable treatment.  
The case of retirement  
As discussed above, the issue of retirement is contentious in terms of age equality, with 
compulsory retirement both strongly embedded in workplace structures, while equally clearly 
amounting to prima facie age discrimination. The Age Regulations introduced in 2006 
attempted to create a compromise by simultaneously encouraging employees to work beyond 
retirement whilst allowing employers to require them to leave. This was achieved by allowing 
compulsory retirement only when the employee had been given the option to request to 
continue to work past the age of 65.184 At the same time, employers were only obliged to 
consider such requests, not to accept them. If employers decided to refuse a request to 
continue working, no reason needed to be given. The ‘right to request’ procedure thus created 
very mixed messages: the required notification of the right to request to continue to work 
before compulsory retirement could be lawful gave the impression that employees had a 
choice as to when to retire, yet in fact employers were under no obligation to grant requests.  
In any event, the right to request procedure was short lived and abolished in 2011. The final 
result of the legislative changes was that under the Equality Act 2010, mandatory retirement 
amounts to direct discrimination and is only lawful if objectively justified as a proportionate 
means to achieve a legitimate aim.  
Of course, in considering whether retirement can be justified in any particular case, Courts 
will refer to the case law of the CJEU, discussed above. Two cases have also been heard in 
the higher courts in England, in which employers have sought to justify reliance on 
mandatory retirement.  
In Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes185 the Supreme Court confirmed186 that reading the 
Equality Act 2010 to comply with the Directive and the case law of the CJEU, the aims 
which can justify direct discrimination, such as retirement, will need to serve objectives of a 
public interest nature and be consistent with the social policy aims of the state. The means 
used must also be proportionate, that is both appropriate to the aim and reasonably necessary 
to achieve it.187  
Mr Seldon, a partner in a law firm, claimed age discrimination when he was made to retire in 
accordance with the rules of the partnership agreement that had adopted a mandatory 
retirement age for partners at 65.188 The firm sought to justify reliance on mandatory 
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retirement on grounds that had been accepted as legitimate by the CJEU, including enabling 
employers to manage workforce planning; promoting better access to employment for 
younger workers; and the aim of avoiding disputes relating to employees’ ability to perform 
their duties beyond the age of 65. Applied in the context of the law firm, mandatory 
retirement at 65 enabled associate solicitors to be given the opportunity of partnership after a 
reasonable period by ensuring a reasonable turnover of staff (creating employment 
opportunities for younger staff);189 it facilitated workforce planning by having a realistic 
expectation as to when vacancies would arise (workforce planning);190 and it contributed to a 
congenial and supportive culture in the firm because it reduced the need to manage partners’ 
performance at the end of careers (avoiding capability disputes).191   
Thus the Supreme Court accepted that the use of mandatory retirement could be justified by 
relying on ‘dignity’ and ‘intergenerational fairness’ as legitimate aims. Although the Supreme 
Court endorsed the use of these aims as legitimate, it did note that it was only the legitimacy 
of the aim that was being decided: the parties still had to show that, on the facts, the reliance 
on the legitimate aim was necessary and proportionate. Lady Hale also noted that the 
‘assumptions underlying these objectives look suspiciously like stereotyping.’192 Although 
accepting that the aims had been recognized in the CJEU case law, Lady Hale was clear that 
the aim of upholding the dignity of older workers by avoiding performance management 
should be applied very carefully in practice, ensuring that the aim must be justified on the 
particular circumstances of the case. 
The acceptance of the dignity and intergenerational aims of retirement by the Supreme Court 
are not surprising given the guidance available from the CJEU. However the fact that both 
aims can be contested as reliant on either age based stereotypes regarding declining capacity 
with age (the dignity aim) or on contested economic assumptions about the labour market 
(intergenerational justice aims) is of note.193 The Court accepted that age discrimination was 
different from other grounds of discrimination because it is not 'binary in nature' but can be 
seen as a 'continuum which changes over time';194 and that 'younger people will eventually 
benefit from a provision which favours older employees’;195 thus accepting the fair innings 
and complete life views of age equality. Yet, as discussed above, such thinking can be 
contested, as not all will have experienced their career ‘innings’ as fair; and it can also play 
into an agenda in which different generations are perceived as in conflict with each other, 
with older people taking an unfair share of social resource.196  
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Having accepted that the employer’s aims were legitimate, the case was remitted to a new 
tribunal to determine whether the pursuit of these aims was proportionate on the facts. In 
Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes (No.2) the EAT ruled that the enforced retirement at 65 of 
the equity partner was justified. One further matter that arose in the case was whether the 
employer had to justify not only the use of age to determine retirement, but the use of the 
specific age of 65. On this issue, the EAT noted that if the particular age had to be justified, 
then it would be impossible to justify a retirement age at all: it would always be possible to 
add an extra year or month to the age and show that this age was less discriminatory.197 
This approach seem reasonable, and is consistent with both Lady Hale’s position in the 
Supreme Court that if retirement rules are generally justified, then their consequences are 
likely to be so too, and the case of Hörnfeldt v Meddelande198 where the CJEU confirmed that 
a blanket rule on retirement could be justified, even if it resulted in some hardship to the 
individual. This approach can also be seen in the House of Lords’ case of Reynolds199 where 
Lord Hoffman pointed out that ‘a line must be drawn somewhere. All that is necessary is that 
it should reflect a difference between the substantial majority of the people on either side of 
the line.’200 
In effect, UK courts have upheld general rules even if they create individual hardship, despite 
the fact that they take a rather different approach to individual cases in relation to other 
equality grounds.201 However, the acceptance of generalised solutions to complex factual 
questions such as whether retirement is proportionate in a given case,202 together with the 
fairly ready acceptance of contested dignity and intergenerational justice grounds for 
justifying discrimination, demonstrates the struggle courts have had in reconciling the 
competing demands of the economic, structural and social dimensions of age equality.203  
A second UK case involving retirement is Harrod v Chief Constable of West Midlands 
Police,204 in which police officers were compulsorily retired. The police force had needed to 
make reductions in staff numbers and the only lawful way to do so was by the application of 
a special police regulation205 that  allows for enforced retirement once an officer has served 
for 30 years, thereby qualifying for a pension of two thirds average pensionable pay. The 
police officers claimed that the use the regulation was indirectly discriminatory on grounds of 
age, as others with less service were not required to retire. The employer justified the use of 
the regulation because it was the only lawful means by which they could reduce their staff 
numbers, because of rules restricting the use of redundancy for police officers. The Court of 
Appeal found that the decision to compulsorily retire the police offers was justified as no 
other method of selection was lawful: the high degree of job security available to police 
officers left very little discretion to the employer and so the use of the regulation was 
proportionate. Again the embedded nature of age discriminatory rules in many workplace 
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practices meant that the Court had to balance social and economic factors in considering the 
lawfulness of compulsory retirement.  
Intersectional claims including age  
Under the Equality Act 2010, claims can only be brought on single grounds. Although the 
Equality Act as originally drafted allows for claims for combined discrimination on the basis 
of two characteristics, this has not been brought into force. Cases have been brought raising 
issues of age and sex discrimination together, however tribunals have only ruled on each 
single ground rather than viewing the characteristics together. For example, in O'Reilly v 
BBC and others206 a 51 year old TV presenter, Miriam O’Reilly, was informed that she was 
no longer required, as the presenter line-up for the show she had presented was to be 
‘refreshed’ in order to attract a larger audience share following its move to a prime time slot. 
The Employment Tribunal found that the BBC had been looking to replace presenters with 
younger people, to appeal to a younger audience. The tribunal did not allow the BBC to rely 
on the assumed prejudice of younger viewers to justify the age discrimination that had 
occurred. However, although the tribunal considered the issue of combined discrimination, it 
rejected the claim that gender had been a factor in the BBC’s decision, either on its own, or in 
combination with age.  
Conclusion on age discrimination in the UK  
This review of the protection against age discrimination in the UK demonstrates its 
compliance with the EU age equality framework. Like the EU law from which it is derived, 
the UK too has been challenged to create a consistent and coherent response to the multi-
dimensional aspects of age equality, discussed in Chapter 1 above. This is reflected in the 
fairly limited scrutiny applied in age cases, together with the acceptance of the continued use 
of age as a criterion in calculating redundancy pay, wages and work benefits. These cases 
also illustrate how age has continued to be embedded in labour market structures in the UK. 
The fairly relaxed acceptance of the justification of mandatory retirement in the cases that 
have come before the courts could also be taken to reflect a somewhat ambivalent approach 
of the courts to tackling structural aspects of age inequality. However, despite the fact that 
where challenged, mandatory retirement has been found to be justified, it should be borne in 
mind that the removal of default retirement ages, and the requirement for its use to be 
justified represents a significant change from the previous norm of retirement at the age of 
65. This will have had a big impact in practice, an impact which does not show if the focus 
remains on cases that are litigated. Indeed, recent figures from the Department of Work and 
Pensions in the UK show that men and women are increasingly staying at work beyond the 
state pension age.207  
In terms of protection against age discrimination more generally, UK courts have taken steps 
to address some of the social dimensions of equality, with a more robust approach in 
discrimination cases which involve reliance on stereotype or prejudicial assumptions based 
on age. For example, where employers have attempted to justify less favourable treatment 
based on age by reference to customer preference this has not been accepted.208 
In effect, courts have responded to the multi-dimensional aspect of age equality by fairly 
ready acceptance of labour market or structural aims as legitimate, whilst at the same time 
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addressing the reliance on stereotypes and prejudicial assumptions related to age. This has at 
times led to a lack of consistency in the treatment of age discrimination. Examples include 
the fact that dignity arguments have been accepted as justifying compulsory retirement 
despite their reliance on inherent stereotypes regarding declining capacity with age; and the 
fairly ready acceptance of cost as a factor justifying differential treatment by age. This 
inconsistency reflects the difficulty inherent in reconciling the competing structural, 
economic and social elements at play in age equality cases.   
Sweden  
As with other northern European states, Sweden has an ageing population, and public policy 
aims to encourage longer working lives.209 Although the focus of its anti-discrimination law 
has been to tackle barriers faced by older workers in order to meet the labour market demands 
of an ageing workforce, attention is also needed on counteracting youth unemployment.  
Sweden’s equality law, the Discrimination Act 2008, implements Equality Directive 2000/78, 
although the legislation was enacted two years after the 2006 deadline provided in the 
Directive. The 2008 Act covers seven grounds including age, and its age protection extends 
beyond the employment sphere to cover education and access to goods and services. Prior to 
this, there was no comprehensive protection against age discrimination, although a 1973 
government regulation prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex or age in state 
employment.210 
In accordance with the Directive, the Swedish legislation protects against direct and indirect 
discrimination, harassment and victimization. Perceived discrimination, discrimination by 
association and instructions to discriminate are also prohibited. As with the EU directive, 
both direct and indirect age discrimination can be justified where proportionate. As well as 
the legislation governing age discrimination, it should be noted that Sweden has a highly 
unionised labour market, and collective agreements govern practice in many workplaces. 211  
Discrimination against younger workers  
As elsewhere in EU, discrimination against younger workers is embedded in many labour 
market structures. Although pay and conditions of work are not provided by statute in 
Sweden, many collective agreements allow for differential terms based on age, such as pay 
rates. These might be seen to be prima facie breaches of the anti-discrimination principle, but 
are usually accepted as justified as protective of younger workers.212 In addition, under the 
1982 Employment Protection Act, a principle of seniority can apply in redundancy cases.213 
This tends to result in discrimination against younger workers who are less likely to have 
built up the longer years of service which can lead to redundancy protection, as well as 
increased redundancy payments.  
In addition to less favourable treatment of younger workers, some more favourable treatment 
for older workers can also be readily justified. For example, two examples can be seen in the 
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travaux préparatoires of legitimate aims that are likely to be treated as both appropriate and 
necessary. First, that better paid vacation conditions are justified because older workers need 
more rest than younger workers in order to be able to work until they retire; and second that 
better conditions regarding periods of notice for dismissals for older workers are also justified 
as an aid to help them work until retirement.214 In addition, collective agreements will often 
include rules on annual leave, redundancy pay etc. based on age.215    
Discrimination against older workers:  
The use of age in redundancy can lead to greater protection for older workers, for example 
seniority schemes such as last in first out. However, as well the Employment Protection Act 
allowing for a principle of seniority to apply in redundancy cases, some redundancy schemes 
will also allow for redundancy selection to be based on age in conjunction with pension 
entitlement. This will lead to less favourable treatment for older workers who become more 
likely to be selected for redundancy as they have pension entitlement. However, where such 
schemes lead to compulsory redundancies they can be difficult to justify.  
For example, in a case involving a redundancy situation for cabin crew216 a collective 
agreement allowed the employer to dismiss all those over the age of 60, as they were entitled 
to a full pension within the employer’s pension scheme. The employer sought to justify the 
age discrimination involved in selecting those over 60 for redundancy on the basis that they 
had right to a full pension; that there were legitimate social reasons to choose them for 
dismissal, namely to distribute employment fairly between generations; and to ensure that the 
remaining employees were not all close to the pensionable age. However, the Labour Court 
held that the same aims could be achieved through a voluntary redundancy scheme, and so 
compulsory redundancy for those over 60 was not proportionate.  
Retirement  
Sweden has no state mandatory retirement age, although employers can impose retirement at 
67 years. Thus employers are allowed to terminate employment for employees with one 
month’s notice when they reach the age of 67. The lawfulness of this provision was 
confirmed by the CJEU in Hörnfeldt v Meddelande and the aims of avoiding humiliating 
dismissals of older workers, adapting to demographic change, and the need to help younger 
workers enter the labour market were accepted as legitimate.217  
However, although employers are able to compulsorily retire staff when they reach 67, 
relying on the labour market justifications identified and confirmed in Hörnfeldt, this does 
not mean that all dismissals from the age of 67 onwards will be lawful. Instead, once the 
employee has passed the age of 67, the legal position reverts to require that any age 
discrimination be justified. This was confirmed in Keolis,218 where the employer legally 
dismissed bus drivers at the age of 67 and re-hired them on a fixed short-term hourly basis. 
This re-employment was not renewed after the age of 70. The court treated non-renewal as 
direct age discrimination: the exception allowing dismissal at the age of 67 only applied at 
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the age of 67, and not beyond.219 Any further age discrimination therefore remained to be 
justified.  
Intersectionality  
Swedish anti-discrimination legislation does not specifically cover multiple discrimination. 
Moreover, although courts have accepted that two grounds of discrimination can arise in a 
single case, the fact that one incident gave rise to two grounds of discrimination did not give 
rise to additional compensation. One example is where an employer discriminated on grounds 
of age and sex by failing to call an older woman to a job interview. Although the employer 
claimed that the woman was not suitable for the job, there was insufficient evidence to refute 
the presumption of age discrimination and sex discrimination.220  Although the Labour Court 
recognised that both grounds of discrimination had occurred, this was not seen as reason to 
increase the damages award.221  
Conclusion  
Sweden’s late adoption of age discrimination laws, together with its broad acceptance of 
exceptions to the principle of equality when it comes to age discrimination, illustrates again 
the difficulties that courts face when implementing age equality protection. The tension 
between meeting structural challenges of an ageing workforce, balancing the interests of 
different age groups, and upholding equal dignity and respect for all workers is illustrated in 
the broader exceptions that are allowed for age discrimination than for other equality 
grounds. In addition, the failure of the Labour Court to recognise intersectional 
discrimination, in particular the cumulative impact of age with gender, is identified by 
Votinius as a limitation of the Swedish anti-discrimination framework.222 
Despite a strong social and legislative commitment to equality in general in Sweden, age 
discrimination is embedded in many of the labour market structures, such as wage setting, 
seniority systems for redundancy, and annual leave entitlements and the acceptance of 
retirement at the age of 67. The somewhat contradictory approach of the legislature and the 
courts in tackling age discrimination, with their fairly ready justification for age 
discriminatory practices, reflects the complicated relationship between the economic and 
social aspects of age equality, discussed in Chapter 1.  
US  
The US has one of the earliest non-discrimination laws specifically relating to age: the 1967 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The ADEA protects against age 
discrimination against those over 40, making it unlawful to  
‘fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age; to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
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employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s age.’223  
The ADEA was introduced soon after, and modelled on, the protection of other equality 
grounds under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. The ADEA protects against disparate 
treatment and disparate impact based on age (i.e. direct and indirect discrimination), as well 
as protecting against harassment and retaliation for opposing or challenging age 
discrimination.224 Discriminatory treatment may be conscious or may be the result of the 
application of stereotypical assumptions. Claims that an employer’s action was motivated by 
age are known as disparate treatment claims. In addition, the Supreme Court has accepted 
claims based on disparate impact, where employment practices or polices are facially neutral, 
but have a disproportionately adverse impact on older workers.225 The ADEA does not 
formally define age discrimination in separate terms (unlike the EU framework in which 
direct and indirect discrimination are defined separately) but the Supreme Court has accepted 
claims based on both disparate impact and disparate treatment.226  
In addition to the ADEA, many individual states have their own laws prohibiting age 
discrimination, some of which predate the introduction of the 1967 ADEA.227 In what 
follows, the focus is on the ADEA as it applies in all states and to all employers with over 20 
employees. 
As with the EU, the US has an ageing population and the law has been developed in this 
context.228 The introduction of the ADEA followed the 1965 Wirtz Report which had found 
substantial evidence of arbitrary age discrimination in the workplace.229 Unlike the law in 
other countries, which is included in a general equality framework, the US age discrimination 
law does not promote age equality in general, but is limited to prohibiting discrimination 
against older workers.  
Discrimination against younger workers  
The ADEA only applies to those over 40, and there are no federal laws protecting against age 
discrimination in general which could be used to protect younger worker against either 
structural inequalities or prejudicial or stereotyped assumptions about their abilities.  
Even if applicants are over 40 themselves, the ADEA does not protect them if they are treated 
less favourably than those of an older age, only if treated less favourably than those who are 
younger. For example, in General Dynamics Land Systems v Cline230 the firm provided 
additional health care benefits for employees who were over 50. A group of staff who were 
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aged 40-49 claimed that this breached the ADEA: they were over 40 and so eligible to make 
a claim, and had been treated less favourably on grounds of age as they were not eligible for 
the additional benefits. Their claim was rejected on the basis that the ADEA does not prohibit 
preferential treatment for older people. The Court referred to the fact that its social context 
and legislative history show that it was aimed to protect older workers and was not intended 
to stop their more favourable treatment.  
The lack of symmetry creates a significant limitation in the legal protection against age 
discrimination in the US,231 as evidence suggests that age discrimination is experienced by 
younger workers as well as older workers.232  Despite the fact that the law in the US was 
formulated to address stigmatising stereotype, which is experienced by young and old, its 
economic dimension becomes clear in the light of this restriction. The main aim of the age 
discrimination legislation was to promote the employment of older workers based on their 
abilities and so to prohibit the reliance on age based stereotypes in hiring decisions. Whilst 
the focus was on confronting stereotypes, the motivation was to address a particular 
economic issue, namely the difficulties caused by an ageing population: and this was to be 
achieved by removing hindrances to their retention and recruitment in the workplace.233  
Discrimination against older workers 
In order to establish an age discrimination claim, the worker must show that he or she is over 
40 and qualified for the position in question; was adversely affected by being dismissed, 
demoted or not offered employment; and that someone similarly qualified but substantially 
younger was employed (or retained) instead. Courts have varied in how much younger a 
comparator must be to count as ‘substantially’ younger, but in most cases the difference in 
age is expected to be at least 10 years.234 The substantially younger person may be over 40, 
so for example a 56 year old who was replaced by a 40 year old could still claim age 
discrimination.235 
Once a prima facie claim of age discrimination is established, the employer can defend the 
claim by pointing to a non-discriminatory reason for the treatment. If the employer is able to 
show an alternative reason for the adverse treatment, the employee may then refute this by 
showing that the employer’s reason was a pretext, for example by showing a pattern of age 
related poor treatment. The US courts have been fairly ready to accept alternative reasons 
than age as explaining adverse treatment, including costs and other reasons that are fairly 
closely linked to age. For example, in Hazen Paper Co. v Biggins236 an employer was able to 
establish alternative reasons for dismissing an employee, on the basis that he was close to the 
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age when his pension entitlement would vest. The Court held that age must have had ‘a 
determinative influence’ on the employer's decision. Here the decision was motivated by 
factors other than age (the vesting of pension) and was not linked to the problem of 
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes about older workers' productivity and competence, 
which was the wrong to which the ADEA was directed. The Court took the view that a 
decision based on years of service was analytically distinct from age.  
 
The ADEA can give rise to disparate impact claims, where reliance on neutral rules have a 
disproportionately adverse impact on older workers.237 In such cases, the employee has to 
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing the disproportionate impact of 
a policy or practice, and the burden then shifts to the employer who may be able demonstrate 
that the policy or practice is based on a reasonable factor other than age. The Supreme Court 
has been clear that the standard of protection for age discrimination is lower than for other 
protected grounds, with the standard of review needed to show that a practice is ‘reasonable’, 
less stringent than the ‘business necessity’ test required to justify discrimination on other 
grounds protected in the USA under Title VII. For example, those claiming age 
discrimination are not able to challenge the justifications put forward by the employer by 
showing that there are alternative less discriminatory practices that could achieve the same 
aim. Moreover, costs based justifications are likely to be accepted as reasonable.238 
Exceptions 
The ADEA provides a number of exceptions and defences to age discrimination claims. 
Certain seniority systems and employee benefits plans are protected under the Act.239 In 
addition, exceptions apply allowing for maximum ages to be set for hiring of staff, and also 
allowing for the dismissal of police officers and firefighters at the age of 55.240  
Age may also be a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the business, or the less favourable treatment may be based on reasonable factors 
other than age.241 The bona fide occupational requirement exception, together with the 
defence that the treatment was reasonably necessary for factors other than age, creates a fairly 
wide space for justifying age discrimination. Unlike the EU legal framework which limits the 
justification of direct age discrimination to reasons linked to broader employment policy,242 
under the ADEA, age discrimination can be justified for reasons that are particular to the 
individual business, including costs, which themselves may be age related.  
The ease with which treatment can be justified when it is clearly age-related, albeit not 
directly based on age, represents a significant weakness in the protection for age 
discrimination in the US.  
The case of retirement  
The prohibition against age discrimination contained in the ADEA applies to retirement, 
making compulsory retirement unlawful.243 There are some exceptions however: retirement is 
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lawful in respect of staff in executive or high policy making positions over the age of 65. This 
exception is subject to the proviso that the employee must have been employed for the two-
years in the high ranking position immediately prior to retirement and must be entitled to a 
pension or equivalent of at least $44,000 a year.244  
Although compulsory retirement for most employees would amount to age discrimination, 
this does not prevent other action to encourage retirement. For example, early retirement 
incentive programmes are lawful, as long as they are voluntary and offered to reduce costs.245 
However, the 1990 Older Worker Benefit Protection Act imposes strict procedural 
requirements on employers who incentivise older workers into retirement.246  
The exclusion of high level policy making roles from the ban on retirement creates an 
interesting tension within the ADEA. One rationale for this exception is given by Lester, as 
allowing employers to replace key employees and keep promotional channels open to 
younger employees.247 Some element of intergenerational fairness is thus recognized within 
the ADEA’s prohibition on retirement, albeit limited to a small number of high level 
appointments. This concern for promotion for younger colleagues, taken with the requirement 
for a healthy retirement income before mandatory retirement can be allowed, as well as the 
limit to high level executives, shows the US system reflecting some of the concerns regarding 
age equality discussed in Chapter 1. The dual role of employment as having an economic as 
well as an expressive function is reflected in the rules. The minimum pension requirement 
demonstrates a regard for the important economic function of work in individual lives and a 
concern to avoid individual disadvantage. The requirement for two years’ prior experience in 
the role signals a recognition that individuals gain personal fulfilment from work, and may 
want to have a reasonable innings in a particular high level and probably rewarding role. 
Moreover, an alternative rationale, based on the difficulty in measuring performance 
objectively, and the emotional distress that may be created in the process suggests that 
broader dignity based arguments also account for the exception for high level executives.248 
However, the recognition of more social aims of equality law, including the concern for 
intergenerational justice, is only very partial under the ADEA and it could be remarked that 
promotional channels are of equal value to younger staff even when not involving promotion 
to high level policy making jobs. The group protected here seems to be those in line for the 
high level jobs, rather than those with perhaps more modest but no less important personal 
ambitions.  
The general prohibition on retirement in the US has led to some noteworthy developments 
from an age equality perspective. Whilst staff do not have to retire, nonetheless the structural 
needs of the labour market, identified in the EU context as ‘legitimate aims’ for imposing 
retirement, still continue, with a need for employment opportunities for younger workers. The 
fact that retirement cannot be used to meet these needs can be identified as a shortcoming of 
the US legal framework. One response by employers has been the introduction of incentives 
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to retire, which are exempted from age discrimination protection. This can be framed as an 
additional benefit for older workers who become eligible not only to pension income but also 
to additional compensation for taking up that income, and as such, these practices can be said 
to lead to double benefits for older workers at the expense of younger workers.  
Intersectionality  
The ADEA does not provide for dual or combined discrimination. Unlike other 
discrimination grounds under the equality provisions of Title VII, in which mixed motive 
cases can be allowed, under the ADEA those claiming age discrimination must show that age 
was the determinative factor for the adverse treatment. The fact that the ADEA does not 
accept mixed motives age discrimination claims was confirmed in Gross v FBL Financial 
Services in 2009.249 As a result, the ADEA has not been able effectively to tackle the 
existence of intersectional and multiple discrimination faced by older women.250 Indeed, 
studies have shown that the majority of successful age discrimination cases have been 
brought by men, dismissed from white-collar or managerial positions.251  
Moreover, the provision of age equality legislation separate from other equality laws makes 
the creation of dual claims more problematic as standards of protection vary. For example, 
where business interests are used to justify disparate impact claims the tests differ, with 
economic necessity required for Title VII claims involving other equality protected 
characteristics, and only reasonable economic needs for age equality cases.  
Conclusion on age discrimination in the USA 
The introduction of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 will certainly have had 
an effect on age equality in the US labour market, and employment practices will 
undoubtedly have been changed on the ground. For example, one result is the removal of age 
limits in job adverts;252 and the Act has been effective in protecting workers who are already 
in employment.253  
Nonetheless, what is clear from this overview of the age discrimination law in the US is that 
the legal framework contains some significant limitations. The first distinctive feature of the 
US law is its asymmetry, and the lack of protection for younger workers, something that 
stands in marked contrast to other jurisdictions. Second, although the US age equality 
framework contains fewer formal exemptions than the parallel protection in other 
jurisdictions,254 the standard of protection remains weak and age discrimination is treated as 
less serious than discrimination based on other protected characteristics. For example, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to extend the same level of scrutiny in cases under the 
ADEA as that applied under Title VII;255 and the decision in Gross v FBL Financial 
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Services256 that age must be a but-for cause for any less favourable treatment significantly 
limits the effectiveness of the protection available.257 The ‘reasonable factor other than age’ 
defence makes it relatively easy for employers to defend cases.  
The protection for age equality in the US is thus somewhat contradictory. One contradiction 
can be seen in the ADEA’s promise of significant protection, which is then undermined by 
allowing fairly ready defences in age discrimination claims. A second contradiction can be 
seen in the bar on retirement, whilst allowing both an exception for high level executives and 
more generally applicable incentives to retire. These exceptions are likely to create additional 
advantage for those who are already more advantaged in socio-economic terms: either by 
creating additional compensation as people are given an incentive to retire; or by opening up 
jobs for the next generation, but only those who will step into the newly vacated well-paid 
high level jobs. These contradictions reflect the tension existing between the competing 
dimensions of age equality law discussed in Chapter 1. On the one hand, the ADEA was 
framed as a response to adverse age based stereotyping, which might suggest that it is 
underpinned by a concern for the social disadvantages of age discrimination. On the other 
hand, the fact that its protection is limited to discrimination against older workers suggests 
that its rationale is economic and structural: the reason for removing reliance on stereotype is 
not so much to address the stigmatic or expressive effects of stereotypes, but rather their 
economic effects.  
Canada 
The legal protection against age discrimination in Canada is provided within the federal legal 
system. All provinces, municipal and federal governments are subject to the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms that contains an equality clause, which includes the right to 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on age. The 
federal Canadian Human Rights Act, which applies to federally-regulated activities and 
entities, prohibits age discrimination and includes exceptions where age is a bona 
fide occupational requirement.258 The Act goes on to provide that for the bona 
fide occupational requirement justification to be made out, it must be established that 
accommodation of the needs of an individual or a class of individuals affected would impose 
undue hardship on the person who would have to accommodate those needs, considering 
health, safety and cost.259 In addition there are exceptions where employment is refused or 
terminated because the individual has not reached the minimum age, or has reached the 
maximum age that applies to that employment by law.260 Mandatory retirement was allowed 
under the Canadian Human Rights Act, but this was abolished by the Government in 2011.  
As well as equality provisions under the Charter and the Canadian Human Rights Act, each 
province has its own equality provisions contained in the legislation of the relevant province. 
To take two examples, the Ontario the Human Rights Code261 provides a right to equal 
treatment without discrimination on grounds of age in a range of fields such as the provision 
of services, accommodation and employment. It provides an exception where age is a 
reasonable and bona fide qualification because of the nature of the employment. The 
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Manitoba Human Rights Code prohibits age discrimination, including within its 
discrimination definition a right to reasonable accommodation, and contains an exception for 
bona fide and reasonable requirements or qualifications for the employment or occupation.262  
All provinces prohibit age discrimination but while accommodation requirements may seem 
to vary, the requirement to consider accommodation is implied: an occupational requirement 
is unlikely to be bona fides if no reasonable accommodation has been made; and where the 
exception is framed in more general terms of a ‘reasonable and justifiable’ defence, the 
question of whether there was an attempt to accommodate may to be relevant to the question 
of justification. That is, the Meiorin case263 clarified that in both direct and indirect cases of 
discrimination, to satisfy the bona fide occupational requirement, the employer has to show 
that it had attempted to accommodate to a point of undue hardship. 
Discrimination against younger workers  
Although the Canadian Human Rights Act protects generally against age discrimination, it 
provides an exception where an individual has not reached the minimum age for a job. Some 
provinces, such as Ontario and Alberta limit the protection of age discrimination to those 
over 18. Others, such as Manitoba do not have such a limitation. 
In relation to discrimination against younger workers, a number of cases have arisen under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms relating to eligibility for various benefits, 
which have been based on age. Whilst they do not relate to employment, these illustrate some 
of the complexities courts have faced in determining age related cases.  
The first case is Law v Canada264 in which a woman who had been widowed under the age of 
30 was not eligible for survivor’s benefits under the Canadian Pension Plan. Eligibility was 
determined by age, with those over 45 eligible for a full pension benefit, and a tapering level 
of benefit for those aged 35-45, and no benefit for those under 35. Law claimed that this was 
discriminatory on grounds of age under the Charter. The Supreme Court found that it was not 
discriminatory. It held that any equality analysis under the Charter had to be purposive and 
contextual: it needed to consider whether the different treatment that arose here had a purpose 
and effect that was discriminatory, in particular whether withholding the benefit reflected the 
use of stereotypes or had the effect of ‘perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual 
is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of 
Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration.’ The Supreme 
Court took the view that in this case, the refusal of the benefit to younger widows was not 
based on negative stereotypes, and did not reflect that younger women were held as of less 
value or deserving of less concern, respect or consideration. Indeed, the Court specified that 
adults under the age of 45 have not been consistently subjected to discrimination. The rules 
did not have the effect of violating the dignity of younger people, but were aimed at helping 
older widows and widowers meet their basic needs in the longer term. Indeed, the aim was to 
help overcome some of the age discrimination that can be faced by older workers who may 
face difficulty finding or maintaining employment as they age.  
The decision in Law reflects many of the limitations of a dignity based approach to 
approaching age equality outlined in Chapter 1 above. The fact that age does not identify a 
‘discrete and insular minority’ nor does it link to historical disadvantage, weighed against its 
protection in this instance.  
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This approach was followed in Gosselin v. Québec265 which involved a social assistance 
scheme which paid those under 30 about one third of the amount paid to those of 30 or over. 
Those under 30 could increase their payment by participating in specified education or work 
experience programmes. This was challenged as a breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.  The Supreme Court 
held that the Charters were not breached. Following the reasoning from Law the Court 
pointed out that younger people did not have any pre-existing disadvantage, stigmatisation or 
history of being undervalued; the aim of the different treatment corresponded to the actual 
need of younger people, having been designed to integrate them into the workforce; and the 
impact was not to undermine human dignity.   
The decision was not unanimous, and a minority took an opposing view, pointing out that 
young people were disadvantaged by the lack of jobs available, that the law was based on an 
assumption that young people needed punitive measure to encourage the take up of training 
opportunities, and that the low level of benefits risked pushing young people into deep 
poverty. This meant that making their receipt of benefits conditional on undertaking further 
activity did undermine their dignity.  
That the same facts led to such different opinions within the Supreme Court illustrates the 
difficulty courts can have in assessing equality claims in relation to age. Even though both the 
majority and minority agreed on the principles that should guide their decision, such as a 
concern to uphold dignity and redress disadvantage, different judges reached opposing 
conclusions when applying these principles to the facts.  
The use of the somewhat vague concept of dignity in these cases has been criticised by many 
scholars,266 and in the later case of R. v Kapp267 the requirement introduced in Law that 
equality claims need to show lack of dignity was removed. The case did not involve age 
discrimination, but rather an affirmative action programme aimed at aboriginal groups. In 
assessing whether s15 of the Charter was infringed, the Supreme Court returned to a two 
stage test focused on whether there is discrimination on a prohibited ground and then on 
whether the treatment had the effect of perpetuating disadvantage or prejudice or was based 
on stereotyping. Although the concept of dignity can still be used, it no longer forms a 
separate part of the legal test of whether there has been unlawful discrimination.268 Instead, 
other factors could indicate disadvantage in a particular case.  
Although the legal test used in Law and Gosselin has been amended in later cases, there is no 
suggestion that the simpler test set out in Kapp would lead to a different outcome in those 
cases. The cases illustrate the difficulty in demonstrating that unlawful discrimination against 
younger people has occurred, given that they are not recognised as a disadvantaged group. 
The focus on disadvantage and dignity in the Canadian case law, rather than a focus on 
differential treatment per se results in limited protection for younger workers from unequal 
treatment. Although the cases have not involved differential treatment of younger workers, 
they suggest that where different treatment such as reduced employment rights is aimed at 
encouraging the employment of younger workers, it will be justified, even if it involves less 
favourable terms and conditions.   
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Discrimination against older workers  
As well as providing an exception where an individual has not reached the minimum age for 
a job, the Canadian Human Rights Act also contains an exception for maximum ages when 
provided to under law or other employment related regulation.   
The provisions protecting against age discrimination will protect employees or prospective 
staff from discrimination based on stereotypes such as assumptions that they are not capable 
of developing new skills. However, despite the fact that age discrimination is protected as 
part of the general non-discrimination provisions, cases involving older workers have not 
always been successful. For example, discrimination needs to be on the basis of age, so that 
actions based on factors related to age, but which are not based on age per se may not lead to 
findings of discrimination. Thus, less favourable treatment that is based on pension status, or 
being over qualified, do not relate to age per se, and so may not lead to findings of age 
discrimination, and where age is the cause of less favourable treatment, cost can be accepted 
as a justification for the differential treatment.269  
Moreover, the duty to accommodate age related needs does not create a stringent requirement 
to accommodate older workers. For example, in Riddell v IBM Canada,270 an older worker 
was unsuccessful in claiming discrimination. Riddell was dismissed after 33 years of service 
following poor performance. He had been moved into administrative and clerical positions 
and had his performance monitored for some time before his dismissal, after having been 
offered early retirement. The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal accepted the employer’s 
position that the dismissal was due to a failure to meet performance standards that were 
imposed across the company and that this was not based on age, and his claim was dismissed. 
The case was treated as one of direct discrimination, but as Alon-Shenker argues, the case 
shows a reluctance by the Tribunal to impose much by way of an obligation on the employer 
to accommodate Riddell’s needs. For example, it did not consider providing the additional 
training that Riddell might have needed due to his age. Alon-Shenker points out that the level 
of accommodation required differs from that required in disability cases, where special 
training to meet a disability need would be likely to be expected of an employer.  
A second example of the ease with which indirect discrimination on grounds of age can be 
justified can be seen in the case of Bastide v Canada Post Corp.271 Casual workers had to 
pass a manual dexterity test as part of the recruitment process for permanent positions. There 
was a statistically significant relationship between age and failure rates on the test, with the 
result that younger staff were promoted to permanent positions ahead of older staff. The 
Federal Court ruled that the test was necessary to assess basic skills and so was a bona fide 
requirement, and that if the test were not used, it would create undue hardship for the 
employer in organizing staffing and in increasing its training costs.  
The case of retirement  
Under section 15(1) of the Charter, age discrimination is unlawful, but the right is not 
absolute, as under section 1 of the Charter rights are subject to ‘such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. Under 
this limitation, retirement provisions have been justified and found to be constitutionally 
permissible.272 Moreover, when originally drafted, the Canadian Human Rights Act created 
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an exception for retirement. However, in 2012, the Act was amended to prohibit mandatory 
retirement. Retirement can still be imposed but only where the employer can show that it is 
necessary as a bona fide occupational requirement.  
Provincial human rights codes also prohibit mandatory retirement, although different 
provinces deal with retirement differently. As originally drafted, most human rights codes did 
not apply to those over 65, effectively creating a freedom for employers to require retirement 
at 65 by removing any cause of action for those over that age. Over time, all provinces have 
repealed their ‘less than 65’ limitation on human rights claims. However, the result has not 
been the abolition of mandatory retirement, as every jurisdiction has legislation allowing 
retirement for particular occupations (for example the judiciary), as well as either exceptions 
for bona fide pension and retirement plans,273 or an exception for bona fide occupational 
requirements, or both.  
Thus, although the legal mechanisms differ, the result is that blanket retirement rules would 
be unlawful, but individual incidents of retirement can be justified, albeit with differing levels 
of scrutiny required in different provinces and under different exceptions. For the exception 
related to pension and retirement plans to apply, retirement only needs to be genuinely part of 
such a scheme. In relation to the more general bona fide occupational requirement exception, 
the Meiorin test applies,274 and retirement must be adopted in good faith, for a rational job-
related purpose, and be reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose. In addition, the 
employer must show that it would be impossible to accommodate individual employees 
adversely affected by the rule, policy or practice without imposing undue hardship on the 
employer. The Meiorin test has meant that routine retirement, in the absence of a retirement 
or pension plan, can be more difficult to justify.  For example, In Way v Department of 
Education,275 a bus driver was dismissed on reaching the age of 65 because of provincial 
regulations requiring retirement at that age for reasons of safety. Way successfully challenged 
the rule on the basis that it had not been shown that the rule was reasonably necessary for 
school bus safety: it had been imposed in a blanket way without any consideration for 
individual circumstances.  
Thus, although clear protection against mandatory retirement exists in Canada, nonetheless, 
retirement can still be justified by employers, as long as reasons are provided and many 
Canadian employees are still made to retire.276 
Intersectionality  
The Canadian Human Rights Act does not explicitly allow for intersectional or multiple 
claims. As with other jurisdictions, where more than one ground of discrimination arises, 
claims would need to be brought on both grounds.  
Conclusion on age discrimination in Canada  
Canada is a jurisdiction with a long record of protecting against age discrimination with 
Charter protection dating from the 1980s, and other protection predating this.277 Despite its 
relatively early adoption of protection for age equality, the courts still face many of the same 
difficulties existing in other jurisdictions that have later adopted age equality laws when it 
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comes to balancing the needs of older and younger workers with the business needs of 
employers. Although the protection extends beyond that available in the EU and the US by 
including a duty of accommodation as well as the prohibition of discrimination, the Canadian 
courts have not used this additional aspect of its equality framework to create extensive 
protection for age equality in the workplace, and the challenge remains to balance dignity and 
respect for workers regardless of age, with the structural needs of the workplace. Instead of 
taking a strong, age inclusive approach, a relatively low standard of review is set and age 
discrimination can be fairly readily justified. The failure of the Canadian framework to create 
a strong framework to protect dignified lives is identified by Alon-Shenker as a particular 
limitation of the Canadian age discrimination framework, together with its lack of recognition 
of the intersection between age and disability.278 Again, the case law reflects the complicated 
relationship between the economic and social aspects of age equality, discussed in Chapter 1. 
In particular, the Canadian cases illustrate the way in which arguments based on dignity can 
work in unpredictable ways in relation to discrimination against younger people, with the fact 
that young people do not have a long history of being undervalued being used to justify age 
discriminatory practices, despite their adverse impact on disadvantaged young people.  
South Africa  
In terms of age equality, the demographics of South Africa differ from the demographics in 
other states considered above, as it has a youthful population and unemployment for young 
people is significantly higher than for older people.279 This means that the economic and 
structural issues influencing labour market policy differ, with intergenerational conflict being 
a particularly current issue. 
South Africa has a progressive Constitution, which contains a strong commitment to equality. 
Section 9 of the Bill of Rights contains a fundamental right to equality on a wide ranging set 
of grounds including age.280 As well as reflecting structural and economic imperatives, the 
Bill of Rights also reflects the social dimensions of age equality. Section 9 prohibits unfair 
discrimination and the Constitutional Court has made clear that in assessing whether a 
particular incident of discrimination is unfair, regard should be had to the role of human 
dignity.281 In addition to the Constitutional protection for equality, age discrimination is 
covered in the equality legislation. The Labour Relations Act 1995 prohibits unfair labour 
practices including age discrimination with an exception of where otherwise discriminatory 
treatment is based on the inherent needs of the job, or if it is based on age and the employee 
had reached the normal retirement age. Schweitzer v Waco Distributors (A division of Voltex 
(Pty) Ltd),282 confirms that once an employee reaches normal retirement age, any subsequent 
dismissal based on age will be lawful.  
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The Employment Equity Act 1998 also prohibits discrimination on grounds of age. It too 
includes exceptions based on the inherent needs of the job, as well as an exception for 
affirmative action. The effect of the Employment Equity Act and the Labour Relations Act is 
that age discrimination is protected through the prohibition of direct and indirect 
discrimination on grounds including age, as well as harassment on grounds of age. Two 
defences exist under the Employment Equality Act 1998: affirmative action and 
discrimination which is linked to the inherent needs of the job. The acceptance of retirement 
under the Labour Relations Act acts as an additional exception to non-discrimination 
prohibition,283 as employers can justify dismissal on the basis that retirement age has been 
reached.284   
Equality law in general is well developed in South Africa, with strong protections in 
employment law and under the Constitution, largely in response to the recent history of 
apartheid with its institutionalised and systematic racial discrimination. Although the equality 
framework is not limited to race discrimination, the significant challenge of tackling race 
discrimination has meant that the case law relating to age discrimination is not as well 
developed.  
Moreover, the particular imperative to create a more diverse workforce, together with 
demographic challenges of under- and unemployment among young people, especially black 
young people, has meant that age related employment practices have not been prohibited. For 
example, age-related discrimination is accepted as lawful in cases such as ‘last in first out’ 
redundancy arrangements. Whilst use of age per se would not be accepted as a criterion for 
redundancy, age related LIFO practices are accepted as objective and fair.285  
The case of retirement  
A mandatory retirement age is not unlawful in South Africa. This perhaps reflects the greater 
concern for the creation of jobs for younger workers, given the very high unemployment rates 
among young people. In addition, retirement can also be justified as a mechanism to promote 
diversity in the future workforce, as older, white, staff are replaced by younger people from 
more diverse backgrounds.286 
Intersectionality   
Given its apartheid history, it is not surprising that South Africa has a particular concern for 
intersectional equality. Access to employment varies by racial group, with Black Africans at 
a particular disadvantage. Looking at the intersection of race and age, elderly Black Africans 
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experience the highest levels of poverty.287 The South African Constitutional Court has 
accepted intersectional discrimination claims, although none of the cases have involved age 
as one of the grounds.288  
Conclusion on age discrimination in South Africa 
The history, social context and demographics of South Africa differ from those of many other 
states with legal provisions governing age equality, with its history of deep and entrenched 
race inequality, as well as a youthful demographic. Yet, despite these differences, as with 
other states, the law relating to age discrimination in South Africa has had to address the 
tensions discussed in Chapter 1, between maintaining the essential dignity of different groups 
of workers by prohibiting discrimination based on stereotype and prejudicial assumptions on 
the one hand, and utilising the labour market as a tool to redress economic and structural 
disadvantage faced by particular groups on the other. 
In South Africa, whilst legislation exists creating a framework to address less favourable 
treatment based on stereotypical views related to age, the balance between the two limbs of 
equality has largely been struck in favour of using age discrimination law to address 
structural and economic aims of equality. In particular, the structural labour market 
mechanisms such as compulsory retirement have been maintained, in part as a way to 
promote diversity, on age and other grounds, elsewhere in the labour market.  
Chapter 3 Conclusion 
A number of challenges involved in tackling age discrimination were identified in Chapter 1, 
ranging from significant societal change in economic and demographic terms, to a lack of 
conceptual clarity regarding the aims of equality law in the context of age. Chapter 2’s 
comparative review of age discrimination in a range of jurisdictions confirms that these 
challenges are indeed reflected in the legal approaches taken to age equality. Although some 
differences can be identified, such as the different economic and demographic factors in 
South Africa, and the fact that the US protection only applies to older workers, the general 
picture arising from the comparison is instead one of common themes: all jurisdictions are 
clear in their rejection of prejudices and stigma related to age; all courts give some 
recognition to the structural dimensions to age equality by adopting a fairly low level of 
review of justification in age discrimination cases; most (with the exception of South Africa) 
view compulsory retirement as prima facie discriminatory, although here again the social and 
economic dimensions of age equality are reflected in the various exceptions through which 
retirement can be justified. Moreover, court decisions can be found in a number of 
jurisdictions that reflect the paradox of relying on dignity as an aim of age equality law, given 
its capacity to act as both a foundation for, and a limit on, the protection of age equality. The 
overarching theme that can be drawn from the comparative review, then, is that there is a lack 
of strong and coherent approach to tackling age equality internationally across the 
jurisdictions, with examples in each state of courts struggling to reconcile the competing 
demands of the economic, structural and social dimensions of age equality. 
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Rejection of Stereotyping and prejudice  
All courts have been clear that discrimination based on stigma and prejudicial stereotypes is 
unlawful. For example, the CJEU in Petersen289 did not accept as legitimate the aim of 
avoiding the decline in dentists’ performance after the age of 68 as this aim was based on a 
stereotype. Similarly, in Canada, in Way v Department of Education,290 the mandatory 
retirement of bus drivers at 65 for reasons of safety was challenged because it had been 
imposed in a blanket way without any consideration for individual circumstances.  
Moreover, good evidence is needed to justify any less favourable treatment based on an 
assumption that performance changes with age. So for example in Wolf291 the discriminatory 
rules on starting work were justified as evidence was produced of a reduced operational 
capacity over the age of 50; and in Bastide v Canada Post Corp.292 the use of manual 
dexterity tests as part of the recruitment process was justified despite its correlation with 
poorer performance for older workers: the manual dexterity was necessary to the job.  
Standard of review 
Although most states are fairly strong in rejecting reliance on stereotypes to justify age 
discriminatory practices, the standard of review of justification in age cases is often lower 
than for other forms of discrimination. In the case of the US, this lower standard of review 
has been recognised explicitly, as the standard of review needed to show that a practice is 
‘reasonable’ is less stringent than the ‘business necessity’ test required to justify 
discrimination on grounds under Title VII. The low level of review in the US is also seen in 
cases where the courts have accepted that the cause of the treatment was not age but 
eligibility for pension,293 something which is technically a separate cause, but which is 
intimately linked to age.   
In the case of the EU member states, there is no formal recognition that different standards of 
review apply, but the case law does suggest that the review is less strict in age cases. For 
example, UK courts have allowed discrimination to be justified on the basis of cost when 
necessary to avoid a windfall pay-out to the claimant.294 Other types of justification accepted 
in the EU also illustrate the relatively low level of review used in age cases. For example, 
Georgiev295 accepted as a legitimate the aim of maintaining a mix of different generations in 
order to promote the quality of teaching and research at universities, and the aim of keeping a 
balance of ages was also accepted in Fuchs and Kohler v Land Hessen.296 Although the 
reason for wanting a mix could be based on operational needs, it is difficult to imagine courts 
accepting that quality of service requires a mix of other protected characteristics, given the 
potential for such rules to act as proxy for prejudicial preferences by customers.  
The reduced standard of review in age cases could be taken to reflect ambivalence on the part 
of courts towards addressing the age based practices that are embedded within labour market 
structures. Whilst this might be said to suggest a lack of understanding of the social 
dimension of age equality, a more generous explanation is that courts are reflecting the need 
to hold the social dimension and the economic dimensions of age equality in balance. On this 
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view, the lower standard of review reflects the fact that in the case of age, and unlike the case 
of other equality strands such as race and gender, there are strong economic and structural 
arguments in favour of age based rules which counterbalance the strong social justice aspects 
to age equality.  
Retirement and intergenerational justice 
The case of retirement was discussed above to illustrate the complexity of the intersection of 
economic and social dimensions of age equality law. Demographic changes have led to 
strong, but contradictory economic claims: in favour of retaining retirement as means to 
address youth unemployment; and against retirement in order to extend working lives as a 
means to address the economic cost of longer lives. The contradictory positions regarding 
retirement are reflected between and within the approaches to retirement in different 
jurisdictions.  
The formal positions as regards retirement vary, with South Africa retaining mandatory 
retirement, the EU allowing mandatory retirement where it is justified, and the US and 
Canada officially prohibiting mandatory retirement. Although the US and Canada allow for 
justification of mandatory retirement in some circumstances, the EU has accepted a wider 
range of justifications, including those based on the economic and labour market aspects of 
age equality. Thus the EU and UK courts have accepted that mandatory retirement can help 
create jobs for younger people, and so have accepted 'inter-generational justice' as a 
legitimate aim for mandatory retirement policies. In contrast, the Canadian approach to 
justification is based on the needs of a particular job, so that it would be more difficult for an 
employer to justify mandatory retirement on the basis that it will free up jobs for younger 
workers. Similarly, the EU cases accept mandatory retirement as a means to avoid difficult 
end of career conversations that can result from loss of capacity, whilst the Canadian case law 
does not support such an approach.  
Nonetheless, even in the case of the stricter protection against compulsory retirement found 
in the US and Canada, the cases suggest that the courts are fairly generous in their acceptance 
of age related justifications, and have accepted as justified treatment that can amount in 
practice to compulsory retirement. Thus, where staff are chosen for redundancy on the basis 
of cost, or proximity to pensionable age, this has been treated not as age discrimination per 
se, but as a separate reason, which is then found not to be unlawful.297    
The relative ease with which mandatory retirement practices can be justified in the EU and 
South Africa, including the acceptance in the EU of the concept intergenerational justice to 
explain the practice, reflects the fairly ready acceptance of the economic dimension to age 
equality. However, the economic and theoretical basis for this approach remains contested,298 
and so it is perhaps unsurprising that this is an area where the formal position differs 
significantly across different jurisdictions, with stricter approaches taken in North America.  
Nonetheless, although explainable, the question of whether mandatory retirement is allowed 
would seem to be core to the understanding of age equality and the fact that there is no 
agreement on whether the practice should be banned clearly illustrates the lack of a coherent 
international response to problem of age discrimination.  
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The dignity paradox  
All courts accept the need to address stigma and prejudicial stereotypes surrounding age, and 
they also accept that mandatory retirement can, with varying levels of ease, sometimes be 
justified. Another common theme is courts’ uneasy approach to the role of dignity as an aim 
for equality law in age related cases. As referred to in Chapter 1, dignity is identified as a 
core aim for equality law, underpinning the rejection of prejudicial age based stereotypes. 
However, dignity can also justify some exceptions to age equality, either where treatment is 
based on the aim of avoiding undignified treatment as people age, or where less favourable 
treatment is allowed due to the absence of any attack on dignity.   
This paradox is seen in the courts’ varied treatment of age discrimination cases. For example, 
the CJEU and domestic courts in the EU have accepted as legitimate the aim of maintaining 
dignity for older workers by avoiding undignified performance management in later 
careers.299 Such an approach relies on the stereotype that performance (and the insight to 
recognize this) deteriorates with age. A second example of the dignity paradox can be found 
in US and Canadian case law, where the absence of the infringement of dignity has been used 
to justify age discrimination. For example in the US case of Hazen Paper Co. v Biggins300 the 
fact that the decision to dismiss was not based on inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes 
meant that it was easier to justify dismissing a worker; and in Gosselin v. Québec301 the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was not breached when younger social assistance 
beneficiaries were treated less favourably, because younger people did not have any pre-
existing disadvantage, stigmatisation or history of being undervalued.  
The paradoxes inherent in relying on dignity arguments in relation to age, identified in 
Chapter 1, can therefore been seen in the case law of several jurisdictions, and can help 
explain some of the inconsistency in courts’ approaches to age equality.  
Recognising structural economic and labour market dimensions  
The review of the law in the different jurisdictions in chapter 2 provides many examples of 
the recognition by courts of the economic and structural dimensions to age equality. For 
example, those jurisdictions which protect young as well as older workers accept differential 
payments for younger workers on the basis that this can aid their entry into the workplace; 
and they also accept differential treatment in the case of compulsory redundancy and 
redundancy pay, to reflect the particular position of older workers with regard to their 
proximity to retirement. On the whole, then, the prohibition of age discrimination has had a 
limited disruptive effect on traditional labour market structures, and courts can be seen to 
accept established age based practices surrounding retirement and pay levels.  
Whilst the different approaches of courts on the issues highlighted above can be understood 
to reflect the tension between economic and social aspects of age equality, they also can be 
seen to be a response to deeper aspects of labour market policy, beyond the immediate issue 
of age based practices.  
For example, it is no surprise that South Africa with its acute concern for the position of 
younger workers, provides less protection for older workers than other states. Similarly, the 
difference in approach between the US and EU frameworks on age equality have been 
explained as reflecting different approaches to equality law more generally in the different 
jurisdictions. Thus, Suk suggests that in the US employment equality is closely tied to 
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preserving individuals’ choice to work, which explains why mandatory retirement ages are 
not accepted. In contrast, in Europe, employment equality ‘requires collectively imposed 
norms about the role of work in a person's life,’302 and so mandatory retirement schemes can 
be justified in the interests of younger workers.  
An alternative explanation of the different approaches, based on underlying labour market 
structures, is suggested by Kollonay Lehoczky, who points to the connection between the 
provision of discrimination protection and levels of legal protection for workers. Thus she 
points to the strong protection against mandatory retirement found in countries such as the 
US which provide weaker protection for older people beyond working age; and conversely 
that better social security provisions, such as those provided in many European countries, are 
often linked to a more permissive legislation and judicial approach to the retention of 
mandatory retirement.303 The recognition that stronger age protection reflects weaker state 
provision is consistent with Somek’s critique of equality law. He argues that equality law acts 
as a means to increase access to work by acting as a corrective to the barriers that otherwise 
exist to greater labour market participation by protected groups. The assumption behind this 
view is that subject to the protection of anti-discrimination law, the market can be left to 
operate with minimal state intervention.304  
Although there may well be different base assumptions underpinning the social model and 
employment policies of different states, the difference in outcome in the different states 
should not be overemphasised however. The relatively relaxed standards of justification, 
based on reasonable business needs, means that in practice the US framework does not 
provide significantly dissimilar protection from other legal systems. For example, under the 
EU framework, retirement must be justified using labour policy reasons: in the US no special 
provision is made, but similar reasons could nonetheless be relied upon to justify the 
imposition of retirement in individual cases. 
Ways forward? A multi-dimensional approach  
The varied economic position as between different states, as well as their very different 
underpinning social policies, could be said to limit the value of the comparative exercise,305 
but nonetheless, the key social aspects of age equality, involving dignity and the removal of 
stigma and disadvantage, suggests that as with other human rights matters, comparative 
review remains of value.306  
What can be seen from this review is that despite different outcomes, the different 
jurisdictions hold in common their frequent efforts to reconcile the varied dimensions to age 
equality. To the variety of legal approaches reviewed in Chapter 2 can be added a further 
variation: the fact that many states have no legislative protection for age at all.  
One interpretation of the variety in legal approaches is that it reflects the complexity and 
inconsistency inherent in the case for age equality discussed in Chapter 1; and the evidence 
from the review of different jurisdictions certainly provides numerous examples of internal 
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inconsistency by the courts, such as the acceptance of ‘collegiality’ as a legitimate aim, 
despite its reliance on stereotypical assumptions about declining performance.  
However, a more optimistic view of the current position is that, notwithstanding its 
limitations, the current legal frameworks contain the tools needed to address the 
shortcomings. This is because the notion of proportionality and reasonableness that are used 
extensively within the law on age equality can be used to take a multi-dimensional approach 
to equality, as advocated by Fredman,307 in which the social and the economic aspects of age 
equality are seen in tandem.  
Fredman suggests that the different dimensions of equality can interact, that the synergies and 
synthesis between them can help resolve difficult cases, and that recognition of the 
interaction of the different aims of equality can help better address the weaknesses of each 
claim. Her multi-dimensional approach is compatible with the current legal frameworks that 
are mostly based on notions of proportionality or reasonableness, and indeed, such a multi-
dimensional approach can be seen to be emerging in the case law of different states. 
Fredman’s approach provides a framework for assessing the weight of the different aspects of 
equality in any particular factual scenario,308 and adds a more sophisticated and nuanced 
understanding of the range of factors that should feed into any assessment of proportionality 
or reasonableness. 
In some contexts, the overriding concern may be to respond to the economic needs of 
demographic change, thereby justifying actions aimed at ensuring access to work for older or 
younger workers. Such an approach can explain the acceptance by the CJEU of the use of 
zero hours contracts only for those under 25 and over 55.309 In other contexts, the purpose of 
age discrimination law may be to address dignitary and stigma harms, such as where 
individuals are subjected to other detriments due to age related stereotyping.310 The 
acceptance by courts of a variety of aims and purposes for age discrimination law has the 
potential for creating nuanced and flexible legal responses.  
One particular advantage to a multi-dimensional approach to addressing age equality is that it 
can be responsive to context, and can reflect the fact that the law does not operate in a 
vacuum. Thus courts may take into account in assessing whether an incident of age 
discrimination is justified, the background level of social protection provided in the 
society.311 For example the existence of adequate state pension entitlements can be relevant to 
the assessment of justification.312    
However, despite these strengths, a multi-dimensional approach also has the potential to 
create inconsistency, leading to the charge of incoherence. Even if the charge of incoherence 
can be dismissed, the plethora of factors that can be taken into account, let alone the fact that 
some such as dignity can be used on both sides in any balance, can mean that predictable 
outcomes are likely to be elusive. Moreover, the very fact that the different dimensions can 
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all have valid and commendable aims, and yet pull in opposite directions, means that the 
decisions in the cases are always open to critique.  
However, the proposal is not to create a formula to ensure that the resolution of age cases can 
be predicted in advance; nor to propose outcomes that are beyond critique. Instead Fredman’s 
multi-dimensional approach can, as she suggests, create a set of evaluative criteria for 
determining the proper approach of courts in age equality cases. Whilst the current legal 
approaches considered above fall short of the nuanced approach advocated by Fredman, 
nonetheless the comparative review of the varied legal approaches to age equality does show 
the beginnings of a multi-dimensional analysis and elements of recognition of both social and 
economic limbs of equality. For example in Seldon313 the UK Supreme Court recognises the 
structural and economic elements of equality, in its acceptance of the need for workforce 
planning, and intergenerational justice, but at the same time, it draws attention to the fact that 
reliance on collegiality as an aim may be contentious on the basis that it relies on prejudicial 
assumptions about capacity and age.  
Equally, a multi-dimensional approach is not used as extensively as it might be: in particular, 
the review demonstrated an almost universal lack of acceptance of intersectional 
discrimination.314 This is despite the fact that the protection of age equality would certainly 
be enhanced by a greater recognition by the courts of the concept of intersectionality with 
regard to age, in particular with the characteristics of gender and disability.  
Despite its limitations in creating predictable and consistent outcomes in individual cases, a 
multi-dimensional approach may still be the best answer, albeit not perfect,315 as to how to 
manage the range of factors that are in play in age equality cases. It involves an appreciation 
of the wide range of competing interests and the underpinning reasons for protecting age 
equality, and relies on reasoned and principled analysis to determine those factors which are 
relevant and how they should be balanced. Although there will always remain an area of 
discretion determining cases, it also requires that any decision be taken in full recognition of 
the competing interests at stake. In effect, such an approach requires a responsive approach 
on the part of courts to take account of the particular factual matrix in any particular situation. 
Of course, while the social aims of equality, based on redressing disadvantage and stigma, are 
likely to remain stable, the economic and social context are likely to change over time. Thus 
demographic changes of increased longevity are likely to lead to structural changes, even if 
these are not mandated by the courts,316 with the removal of state retirement ages already 
leading in some states to an extension in working lives.317 In addition, the continued use of 
soft law to promote active ageing and to redress youth unemployment may lead to social 
change.318 The economic situation can also change; economic recovery in states with high 
youth unemployment would shift the way in which disadvantage and intergenerational justice 
are used by courts in assessing whether age discrimination is assessed. Changes to patterns of 
work, whether due to increased longevity, or increased mechanisation, are likely to affect 
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working cultures and may also lead over time to a breaking down of age stereotypes as 
expectations and experiences of working life adjust. A legal approach which is capable of 
adapting and responding to culture and context is therefore essential.  
This comparative review of legal responses to age equality provides evidence that there is 
still some way to go before sustainable and coherent legal responses to the issue of age 
equality can be achieved.319 Yet the multi-dimensional approach to age equality advocated 
here is identifiable as present or at least emergent in the legal frameworks discussed, allowing 
space for these extra-legal changes in the social and economic context to be recognised in a 
responsive legal approach to age discrimination.  
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